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There has been a good deal of talk lately to the effect that Miranda1 is
dead or dying—or might as well be dead.2 Even liberals have indicated
that the death of Miranda might not be a bad thing.3
This brings to mind a saying by G.K. Chesterton: “Don’t ever take a
fence down until you know the reason why it was put up.”4

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 280–83 (2008); Barry
Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99
GEO. L.J. 1 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003);
George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092–95 (2003); cf. Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1246 (2001) (“[A]s interpreted by the postMiranda Court, the extent to which Miranda’s safeguards protect suspects from pernicious
interrogation practices is extremely limited.”).
3. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1523–25, 1590–1600
(2008).
4. The saying is usually attributed to G.K. Chesterton. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A
THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 106 (1965) (noting that President
Kennedy kept a collection of sayings in a notebook, including the one set forth in the text—which
he attributed to G.K. Chesterton). Judge William C. Griesbach, The Joy of Law, 92 MARQ. L. REV.
889, 892 (2009), also credits Chesterton with this saying.
However, the saying seems to be a paraphrase or compressed version of what Chesterton actually
said. His point was that if you find a fence in a certain place, somebody might have had a good
reason for putting one there. Until you know what that reason might be, you should not consider
tearing the fence down. See The Drift from Domesticity, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF G.K.
CHESTERTON 157, 157 (1990).
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WHY DID THE WARREN COURT BELIEVE SOMETHING
LIKE MIRANDA WAS NEEDED?

Why was the “Miranda fence” erected? Because the “fence” it
replaced—the due process/“totality of circumstances”/“voluntariness”
test—proved to be “an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation
was at stake.”5 As the “voluntariness” test evolved, the terms typically
used in administering it (e.g., “voluntariness,” “coercion,” “breaking” or
“overbearing” the will) became increasingly unhelpful. They did not
focus directly on either of the two grounds for excluding confessions: (a)
their untrustworthiness or (b) disapproval of the methods used by the
police in obtaining them.6
Nor is that all. As Stephen Schulhofer has observed, because of its
sponginess and “subtle mixture of factual and legal elements,”7 the preMiranda test “virtually invited” trial judges to “give weight to their
subjective preferences” and “discouraged active review even by the most
conscientious appellate judges.”8

5. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., for a 5-4
majority). In the course of arguing successfully in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000),
that a 1968 federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda (a statute widely known as § 3501) should
be struck down as unconstitutional, the U.S. Department of Justice “recall[ed] that the Miranda
Court arrived at its solution only after concluding that the ‘totality of circumstances’ voluntariness
test, as the sole protection for the Fifth Amendment rights of a custodial suspect, had failed . . . . It
was inadequate because a ‘totality’ test, without more, provided insufficient guidance to the police,
left inadequate means for this Court to unify and expound the law, and resulted in an uncertain legal
rule that could not secure the vital constitutional rights at stake.” Reply Brief for the United States at
20, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525).
6. This was pointed out more than a decade before Miranda. See Monrad Paulsen, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 418–19, 429–30 (1954); see
also Francis Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 235 (1959). As Louis Michael Seidman has pointed out, at the very end of his
long career, in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1991) (plurality opinion), Justice Frankfurter
tried to make sense of, and to defend, the “voluntariness” test—in “sixty-seven pages of elegantly
written prose.” Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 730–33 (1992).
“Despite his herculean effort,” Frankfurter “succeeded in attracting only one other Justice to his
opinion” (Stewart). Id. at 732. “[T]he Justices who concurred [with Frankfurter] on an analytical
framework for resolving the problem disagreed on the result produced by that framework, while the
Justices who concurred on the result disagreed on the analytic framework producing the result. In
short, the Culombe opinion was a total disaster.” Id. at 733.
7. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (1981).
8. Id. Even the late Bill Stuntz, one of Miranda’s strongest critics, recognized that:
[T]he three decades before Miranda showed that a case-by-case voluntariness inquiry sorted
badly, and at least part of the reason was that courts had a very hard time judging, case by case,
the difference between good and bad police interrogation tactics . . . . By 1966, the
voluntariness standard seemed to be failing, and so could not do the job for which it was
designed: It could not separate good police tactics and good confessions from bad ones.
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“Given the Court’s inability to articulate a clear and predictable
definition of ‘voluntariness,’ the apparent persistence of state courts in
utilizing the ambiguity of the concept to validate confessions of doubtful
constitutionality, and the resultant burden on [the Court’s] own
workload,”9 it is hardly surprising that in 1966 what might be called the
“voluntariness fence” was finally torn down in favor of a new one.
If a picture is worth a thousand words, perhaps the same can be said
for a specific case and its graphic details. I am not going to return to the
1930s and 40s, when police interrogators sometimes resorted to the whip
or the rope. I am only going to recall a case decided in the late 1970s—
Mincey v. Arizona.10
As I shall discuss shortly, the first blow the post-Warren Court dealt
Miranda was in 1971. That year the Burger Court told us that even
though statements obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used in
the prosecution’s case-in-chief, they could still be used to impeach the
defendant’s credibility if he testified on his own behalf.11 However, the
prosecution could not use the defendant’s statements for any purpose if
they were “coerced” or “involuntary.” The question presented in the
Mincey case was not whether the police had violated Miranda (the state
conceded they had), but whether they had failed to satisfy the
voluntariness test.
During a narcotics raid on Mincey’s apartment, a police officer was
shot and killed. Mincey himself was shot in the hip. According to the
attending physician, Mincey “arrived at the hospital ‘depressed almost to
the point of coma.’”12 Tubes were then placed in his throat to help him
breathe, a catheter was inserted into his bladder and a device was
attached to his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. Mincey was

William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 980–81 (2001).
Because suspects may not be in custody when they are interrogated by the police or because they
may validly waive their rights before being questioned by the police, the due process/voluntariness
test is still very much alive. But I know of no reason to believe that the test is any more manageable
today than it was in pre-Miranda days. After reading thousands of “voluntariness” cases from 1985
to 2005, Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601 (2006), concludes that the test “offers almost no
guidelines for lawyers and judges” and that the rules governing the test “are just as poorly and
inconsistently applied as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. In comparison, the imprecisely bright
line rules of Miranda look very good.” Id. at 643–44.
9. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03
(1977).
10. 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (per Stewart, J.).
11. See infra notes 75–95 and accompanying text.
12. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398.
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then taken to the intensive care unit.13
At eight o’clock that evening, a detective came to the intensive care
unit to question Mincey about the slaying of the police officer. Unable to
talk because of the tubes in his mouth, Mincey could only respond to the
detective’s questions by writing his answers on pieces of paper provided
by the hospital.14 As the Court described the situation, “while Mincey
was being questioned he was lying on his back on a hospital bed,
encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus. He
was . . . unable to escape or resist the thrust of [the detective’s]
interrogation.”15
When given the warnings required by Miranda, Mincey invoked his
Miranda rights. But to no avail. “Although [he] asked repeatedly that the
interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, [the detective] continued
to question him until almost midnight.”16
Although it is hard to believe, the Arizona courts concluded that
Mincey’s confession was “voluntary.” The Supreme Court reversed, but
the vote was not unanimous. Justice Rehnquist dissented, maintaining
(as other Justices had in the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” cases) that “the
Court today goes too far in substituting its own judgment for the
judgment of a trial court and the highest court of a State, both of which
decided these disputed issues differently than does this Court, and both
of which were a good deal closer to the factual occurrences than is this
Court.”17
One might say that the Mincey case demonstrates that the
administration of the “voluntariness” test does work. After all, the
judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court was reversed in that case. But
we should keep in mind that in the thirty years between Brown v.
Mississippi18 (the first state due process/“voluntariness” case the
Supreme Court ever reviewed) and Miranda, the High Court decided an

13. See id. at 396.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 399.
16. Id. at 396. Moreover, at the time the detective asked the questions, he made no record of
them. In a report dated about a week later, the detective “transcribed Mincey’s answers and added
the questions he believed he had asked.” Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 410. Mincey was not the only time state courts ruled that a confession obtained from a
wounded and hospitalized person was “voluntary” only to have the U.S. Supreme Court reverse. In
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam), a confession was obtained from a murder
suspect while (a) he was bleeding from a bullet wound in his leg (which was amputated soon
afterwards) and (b) he was under the influence of a morphine injection that had been given to him to
ease his pain. Id. at 36–37.
18. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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average of only one state confession case per year.19 And most of them
were death penalty cases.20 As Justice Black said of the due
process/“voluntariness” test during the Miranda oral arguments, “[I]f
you are going to determine it [the admissibility of the confession] each
time on the circumstances . . . [if] this Court will take them one by
one . . . it is more than we are capable of doing.”21
II.

CONFUSION OVER, AND RESISTANCE TO, MIRANDA

To a considerable extent, Miranda was going to turn on how broadly
or narrowly the Court would read Escobedo v. Illinois.22 Because the
defendant in Escobedo had both requested and retained counsel, it was
possible to read Escobedo quite narrowly. But the Warren Court was
highly unlikely to do so. Even James Thompson, who had the distinction
of making the losing argument in Escobedo, recognized this. Indeed,
Thompson came quite close to predicting what the Miranda warnings
would be.23
But other predictions of what the Warren Court would tell us in
Miranda proved to be wide of the mark. A month before Miranda was
decided, Henry Friendly, a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
19. Counting Brown, the Supreme Court decided thirty-five state confession cases from 1936
through 1965. See National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Defender Newsletter, Vol. II, no.
5, Sept. 1965.
20. See E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 297–98, 305 (1961).
21. See 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 881, 894 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (quoting
oral argument of Mr. Victor Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York, companion case to
Miranda).
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. As assistant director of the Northwestern Law School’s Criminal Law Program, Thompson
told a group of prosecuting attorneys shortly after Escobedo was handed down that even if a suspect
had neither retained nor requested counsel the police should inform him of his right to remain silent
and that anything he said could be used against him. Moreover, added Thompson, even though a
suspect had not asked for a lawyer or indicated that he knew he had a right to one, “absolute
compliance with the Escobedo rule may well require a warning of the right to counsel, along with
the warning of the privilege against self incrimination.”
Thompson emphasized that “in no other area of the criminal law has the Supreme Court taken
more pains to carefully scrutinize the application of the doctrine of waiver by uncounseled
defendants than in the area of the waiver of the right to counsel itself. Verbal waivers related to
police officers, contradicted by the defendant at the trial, will almost certainly not pass muster.”
Substantial extracts from Thompson’s remarks appear in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in YALE KAMISAR, FRED INBAU &
THURMAN ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 66–68 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
A young Northwestern University law professor at the time he argued Escobedo, Thompson later
became Governor of Illinois.
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Second Circuit and one of the most respected judges in the nation,
balked at “conditioning” police questioning “on the presence of
counsel.”24 To do so, maintained Judge Friendly, is “really saying that
there may be no effective, immediate questioning by the police” and
“that is not a rule that society will long endure.”25
We shall never know how long society would endure such a rule
because neither the Warren Court nor any other court ever handed down
such a rule. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor reminded us, speaking for
the Court twenty years later, Miranda rejected the ACLU’s argument
that nothing less than “the actual presence of a lawyer” was required to
assure the admissibility of an incriminating statement (as opposed
merely to a police warning that the suspect had a right to a lawyer).26
Nonetheless, this did not prevent the author of a well-known book on the
Warren Court’s “revolution” in American criminal procedure from
leading us to believe that one of the reasons Miranda was so heavily
criticized was that it “condition[ed] questioning on the presence of
counsel.”27
Even those who welcomed Miranda recognize that the Warren Court
blundered when it applied Miranda to all cases tried after the date of the
decision—even though the police interrogation had occurred and the
confession had been obtained before the Miranda case had been
decided.28 By doing so, the Court confused many people and led them to
believe that “Miranda had affected police interrogation far more than it
actually had.”29
In the weeks immediately following Miranda, a number of selfconfessed killers did walk free. This was bound to anger many people.
Lawyers may have understood that the confessions being thrown out
involved “only a relatively tiny, special group,”30 but a great many

24. Remarks of Judge Henry Friendly, 43 A.L.I. PROC. 250–52 (1966) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 250; see also Symposium, Has the Court left the Attorney-General Behind?, 54 KY. L.J.
464, 521, 520, 523 (1966) (pre-Miranda), where a highly regarded state judge, Walter Schaefer of
the Illinois Supreme Court, maintained that effective criminal law enforcement “is not compatible
with a prohibition of station house interrogation or with the presence of a lawyer during [such
interrogation].”
26. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (emphasis added).
27. FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 7 (1970).
28. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
29. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 184.
30. Id. at 185. The Warren Court soon realized its mistake. A year later, when it applied the right
to counsel to lineups and other pretrial identifications in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), the Court limited the new ruling to identifications conducted in the absence of counsel after
the date of the Wade decision.
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people did not. They believed, rather, that self-confessed killers “would
continue to go free, so long as the Miranda case remained on the
books”—providing “tremendous emotional impact to the argument that
voluntary confessions should be usable in court, as they always had
been.”31
But Miranda ran into a more formidable (and more enduring)
problem—what might be called the great tensions and violence of the
times. As Fred Graham, then the Supreme Court correspondent for the
New York Times, observed:
No one could have known [when the Court began to restrain the
power of the nation’s police in the 1960s] that it would coincide
with the most troubled period of violent crime and racial unrest
that has occurred in the [twentieth] century. As it turned out, the
cycles of legal reform and rising crime and racial tensions
moved in uncanny rhythm . . . . In 1962, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s crime index swung upward, after several stable
years. By the mid-1960s, record crime increases were being
registered each year and waves of Negro riots were raking the
cities each summer . . . . History has played cruel jokes before,
but few can compare with the coincidence in timing between the
rise in crime, violence and racial tensions in the United States
and the Supreme Court’s campaign to strengthen the rights of
criminal suspects against the state . . . . [T]he Supreme Court’s
reform campaign eventually encountered a monumental
incongruity—the Court had announced the most rigid legal
limitations that any society had sought to impose on its police at
a time when the United States had the most serious crime
problem of any so-called advanced nation in the world.32
III. THE POLITICIANS GET INTO THE ACT
Unfortunately, too many politicians could not resist the temptation to
blame the rising crime and racial tensions on cases like Escobedo and
Miranda. A striking example is the performance of Senator John
McClellan, who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings on the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,33 the Act that
contained a provision (generally known as § 3501) purporting to abolish
Miranda and to replace it with the old “voluntariness” test.

31. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 186.
32. Id. at 3–4.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
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When Senator McClellan urged the need to pass § 3501, he propped
up a huge facsimile of the FBI’s crime graph. “The titles of key Supreme
Court decisions were marked at the peaks along the rising line, to show
the embarrassing parallel between Supreme Court activity on behalf of
defendants and the crime rise.”34 McClellan then said:
Look at [the crime graph] chart. Look at it and weep for your
country. Crime spiraling upward and upward and upward.
Apparently nobody is willing to put on the brakes. I say to my
colleagues today that the Senate has the opportunity—and the
hour
of
decisions
is
fast
approaching35 . . . .
. . . [If this bill is defeated] every gangster and overlord of the
underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist, robber . . . will have
cause to rejoice and celebrate.36
Senator Sam Ervin turned out to be McClellan’s chief lieutenant.
And, he, too, was quite forceful:
If you believe that the people of the United States should be
ruled by a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court
Justices rather than by the Constitution of the United States, you
ought to vote against title II. If you believe that self-confessed
murderers, rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought
to go unpunished, you ought to vote against [this bill] . . . . 37
. . . [The Miranda majority subscribed] to the strange theory that
no man should be allowed to confess his guilt, even though the
Bible says [and others declare] that an honest “confession is
good for the soul.” Hence, [the Miranda majority] invented
rules . . . to keep people from confessing their crimes and sins.38
Both the Senate and the House passed the bill by overwhelming
margins. The vote was an astonishing 72 to 4 in the Senate and equally
lopsided in the House—369 to 17.39
True, from the outset, the constitutionality of § 3501 was in serious

34. Id. at 12.
35. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,146 (May 21, 1968) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
36. Id. at 14,155.
37. Id. at 14,155 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
38. Id. at 14,030.
39. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
893, 894 (2000). June 5, 1968, the day the House began consideration of the Senate bill, was also
the day Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. Some Congressmen cited the assassination as
a reason for prompt action on the Senate bill. This was ironic. According to Senator Kennedy’s
legislative assistant, Peter Edelman, the Senator was “very deeply opposed” to the bill purporting to
abolish Miranda. See id. at 893–94, 894 n.63.
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doubt (although the issue was not resolved until more than thirty years
later).40 Nevertheless, as one commentator observed shortly after § 3501
was enacted, “it expresses a mood that the Court is not likely to ignore
when [cases] involving the application, and particularly the extension, of
Miranda come before it.”41
Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon demonstrated that
when it came to blaming the Supreme Court for rising crime rates and
other social ills, he yielded to no southern Democrat. In a typical
campaign speech, Nixon would report that a cab driver, an old woman,
and an old man were brutally murdered, but in all three cases the killer
was “let off”— even though he had confessed to the crime—“because of
a Supreme Court decision.”42
As Frank Allen has noted, Mr. Nixon reduced “the bewildering
problems of crime in the United States” to “a war between the ‘peace
forces’ and the ‘criminal forces.’”43 Nixon mentioned Miranda and
Escobedo specifically. These two cases, he charged, “have had the effect
of seriously ham stringing the peace forces in our society and
strengthening the criminal forces”—and “[t]he balance must be shifted
back.”44
Mr. Nixon’s unhappiness with the Supreme Court turned out to be
more significant than Congress’s. He was elected President and in his
first term he made four Supreme Court appointments: Warren Burger,
Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., and William Rehnquist.
The new President did his best to make sure none of his appointees
were enamored of the Warren Court’s “revolution” in criminal
procedure. And none of them were. Nor did President Nixon have any

40. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
41. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 810 (1970).
42. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 15.
43. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539 (1975), referring to Mr. Nixon’s position paper on crime, Toward
Freedom from Fear, dated May 8, 1968 [hereinafter Nixon, Position Paper on Crime], available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xfe16b00/pdf;jsessionid=B3108BC30B410939156F8DCF38F2F11
4.tobacco03.
44. Id. In his position paper Mr. Nixon emphasized that at the time only “one of eight major
crimes . . . results in arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment – and a twelve percent chance
of punishment is not adequate to deter a man bent on a career in crime.” Id. This one-in-eight
statistic is highly misleading. Even if all arrests led to prosecutions and convictions, only one
reported crime in six would result in a conviction because only one reported crime in six leads to
criminal prosecution. Most reported crimes never lead to an arrest. See Yale Kamisar, How to Use,
Abuse—and Fight Back with—Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1972).
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reason to think otherwise.45 That President Nixon was successful in this
respect should come as no surprise. By the time a person is old enough
to be considered for the U.S. Supreme Court, he or she is more likely to
have made up his or her mind about the death penalty, the search and
seizure exclusionary rule, and Miranda than on most matters.
IV. PRESIDENT NIXON NOMINATES WARREN BURGER TO BE
CHIEF JUSTICE
According to then-candidate Nixon, the Warren Court’s prodefendant criminal procedure cases underscored the need for future
presidents to appoint Supreme Court justices “who are thoroughly
experienced and versed in the criminal laws of the land.”46 But Warren
Burger had no background in criminal law. Ironically, Earl Warren, the
person Burger replaced, did. In fact, Warren had been a prosecutor for
eighteen years. Moreover, he had actually interrogated murder

45. Warren Burger and William Rehnquist are discussed in the text below. As for future Justice
Powell, he was appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to the Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice in 1965. The Commission issued its report two years later. Mr. Powell
was one of seven members of the Commission to sign a supplemental statement expressing great
concern about the adverse impact of Escobedo and Miranda on law enforcement. He and the six
other commission members maintained that “the legitimate place of voluntary confessions in law
enforcement must be reestablished” by returning to the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” test even if, “as
now appears likely, a constitutional amendment is required.” See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 303, 307–08 (1967). The supplemental statement also stressed the
need to allow for comment on the failure of a defendant to take the stand in his own defense and the
need for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases—again, by a constitutional amendment, if necessary.
See id.
As for Harry Blackmun, he and Warren Burger were close friends since childhood. In 1961, when
both were federal court of appeals judges, Burger had felt comfortable enough with Blackmun to
write him a letter referring to “those bastards on the Supreme Court who . . . ‘turn every criminal
appeal into a quest for error.’” SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL
CHAMPION 244 (2010). Shortly before he was nominated to be Chief Justice, Burger (at the
suggestion of President Nixon) had sent Attorney General John Mitchell some Supreme Court
recommendations and Harry Blackmun’s name had been on the list. As Nixon aide John Ehrlichman
put it, Blackmun “could be expected to follow closely the new Chief Justice’s lead.” JOHN D.
EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 129 (1982).
Linda Greenhouse, in her article LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 186 (2005),
notes that Chief Justice Burger “had clearly believed that [Justice] Blackmun would enlist in his
causes, but his agenda was not Blackmun’s. It did not take long for that fact to become clear.”
Greenhouse then points to a study showing that in his first five years on the Court, Blackmun voted
with Burger in 87.5% of the closely divided cases, but in the next ten years Blackmun voted more
often with Justice Brennan than with the Chief Justice.
46. See Nixon, Position Paper on Crime, supra note 43.
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suspects.47 On top of that, he had been California’s Attorney General for
four years.48 He probably had a more extensive background in criminal
law enforcement than anyone who has ever served on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Nixon did not want to put people on the Court who happened to be
“thoroughly experienced” in criminal law. He sought people rather who
were likely to be “law-and-order” justices regardless of whether they had
any background in criminal law. He wanted people like Warren Burger.
In his dissenting opinions and public speeches, Judge Burger had left
no doubt that he was quite unhappy with the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure rulings—and equally unhappy with the liberal judges on his
own court.49 Dissenting in a 1967 case, Burger observed:
I suggest that the kind of nit-picking appellate review exhibited
by reversal of this conviction may help explain why the public is
losing confidence in the administration of justice. I suggest also
that if we continue on this course we may well come to be
known as a society incapable of defending itself—the impotent
society.50
Dissenting in a 1969 confession case, one decided only a short time
before he was nominated to be Chief Justice, Burger maintained:
We are well on our way to forbidding any utterance of an
accused to be used against him unless it is made in open court.
Guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant in the criminal trial as we
flounder in a morass of artificial rules poorly conceived and
often impossible of application.51
Before ascending to the Supreme Court, Burger did not restrict his
criticism of the American criminal justice system to his dissenting
opinions as a federal judge. He also had his say in speeches and articles.
In a 1964 speech,52 Burger trashed the search and seizure
47. See Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement Affected His
Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 11–12 (2005).
48. See id.
49. By the time Judge Burger was nominated to be Chief Justice, it was plain that he had become
the principal antagonist of the liberal Chief Judge of his court, David Bazelon. But the intensity of
Burger’s dislike of Bazelon was not as well known. According to STERN & WERMIEL, supra note
45, “Burger privately mocked Bazelon in letters as ‘Baz’ and called in Washington reporters for offthe-record conversations in which he dismissed [Bazelon] as ‘misguided,’ ‘pathetic,’ and ‘a menace
to society.’ [Justice] Brennan heard all about the conflict from Bazelon. ‘It was a blood feud, there
isn’t any doubt about that,’ Brennan said.” Id. at 243.
50. Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., dissenting).
51. Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., dissenting).
52. Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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exclusionary rule, doubting whether the rule (he liked to call it the
Suppression Doctrine, perhaps because that sounded more ominous) was
ever anything more than “wishful thinking.”53 And he wondered
“whether any community is entitled to call itself an ‘organized society’
if it can find no way to solve this problem [police engaging in
unreasonable searches or seizures] except by suppression of truth in the
search for truth.”54
A 1967 speech by Judge Burger, reprinted in U.S. News & World
Report,55 caught the attention and the approval of future President
Nixon.56 Burger’s 1967 article sounded a good deal like a Nixon
campaign speech—perhaps because “Nixon referred to and quoted from
the Burger article often during his 1968 campaign.”57 Judge Burger’s
article deplored America’s high crime rate and stressed the need to shift
the balance in favor of law and order. The article began:
People murder others in this country at the rate of more than one
for every hour of the day . . . .
. . . The murder rate is 10,000 human lives a year, which is
higher than the death rate in our current military operations in
Vietnam which inspire such emotional and violent public
demonstrations.58
The judge wondered whether “a judicial system which consistently
finds it necessary to try a criminal case 3, 4 or 5 times” deserves “the
confidence and respect” of “decent people.”59 He looked admiringly at

53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 23.
55. Warren E. Burger, What to Do about Crime in U.S.: A Federal Judge Speaks, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 7, 1967, at 70.
56. According to John Dean, future President Nixon sent Judge Burger a letter complimenting
him on his U.S. News article. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 12–13 (2001). John
Ehrlichman, who served as an assistant to President Nixon, tells a somewhat different story: Shortly
after his inauguration, President Nixon asked Judge Burger to come to the White House to
administer the oath of office to some of the President’s new appointees. Judge Burger brought with
him a copy of the speech that had been reprinted in U.S. News. After the President and Judge Burger
had talked for a while, the President handed Ehrlichman a copy of the Burger speech and told him to
disseminate it to various people (including Attorney General John Mitchell, who was in charge of
Supreme Court appointments). The President also told Ehrlichman to “keep in touch with the
Judge.” He did not have to do much to carry out the President’s orders, recalls Ehrlichman,
“because Burger was a past master at keeping in touch.” From that point on, Ehrlichman received a
number of notes from Burger about the Supreme Court, law enforcement, and other topics. See
EHRLICHMAN, supra note 45, at 114.
57. DEAN, supra note 56, at 13.
58. Burger, supra note 55, at 70.
59. Id. at 72.
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“North Europe countries” such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and
Holland, where “there is much less crime generally than in the United
States.”60
These “North Europe countries,” pointed out Burger, “do not consider
it necessary to use a device like our Fifth Amendment under which an
accused person may not be required to testify. They go swiftly,
efficiently and directly to the question of whether the accused is
guilty.”61 Compared to American criminal justice, noted Judge Burger,
the Northern European countries’ “system of finding the facts
concerning guilt or innocence is almost ruthless.”62
V.

PRESIDENT NIXON NOMINATES WILLIAM REHNQUIST
TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

Warren Burger’s record as a federal Court of Appeals judge and as a
speaker and writer left little doubt that as a Supreme Court justice he
would read the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases as grudgingly
as possible. But when it came to “law and order” another Nixon
appointee yielded to no one—William Rehnquist.
Rehnquist was only in his new post as Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Legal Counsel for a few months before he wrote
a memorandum to John Dean (of Watergate fame) underscoring the need
to re-examine such cases as Escobedo and Miranda.63 One can get a
good sense of what the future Supreme Court Justice thought about the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings by studying this
memorandum.
“[T]here is reason to believe,” maintained Rehnquist, “that the
Supreme Court has failed to hold true the balance between the right of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to John W. Dean III, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen. (Apr. 1, 1969) [hereinafter Rehnquist
Memorandum] (on file with the Washington Law Review). The memorandum was marked
“administratively confidential.” According to Dean, this “kept it locked up for many years.” DEAN,
supra note 56, at 268. I am indebted to Professor Thomas Y. Davies of the University of Tennessee
College of Law for calling this memorandum to my attention and providing me with a copy (which
he obtained from the National Archives).
Rehnquist’s proposal to establish a commission to determine whether some of the Warren Court
rulings called for a constitutional amendment never went beyond Dean’s discussion of the issue
with Attorney General John Mitchell. The Attorney General thought “it might create a problem if
the Nixon administration could not control such a commission which would not be easy.” DEAN,
supra note 56, at 269.
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society to convict the guilty and the obligation of society to safeguard
the accused.”64 Therefore, recommended Rehnquist, “the President
[should] appoint a Commission to review these decisions, to determine
whether the overriding public interest in law enforcement . . . requires a
constitutional amendment.”65
Although the Rehnquist memorandum voiced unhappiness with other
matters (such as the search and seizure exclusionary rule and the sharp
increase in habeas corpus petitions),66 it focused primarily on police
interrogation and confessions:
Limitations both drastic and novel have been placed on the
use . . . of pre-trial statements of the defendant . . . .67
. . . The Court is now committed to the proposition that relevant,
competent, uncoerced statements of the defendant will not be
admissible at his trial unless an elaborate set of warnings be
given which is very likely to have the effect of preventing a
defendant from making any statement at all.68
Up to this point, Rehnquist’s criticism of Miranda was certainly
debatable. But then he made a mistake. He recalled Justice Robert
Jackson’s observation that “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement under any
circumstances.”69
By quoting Justice Jackson in the manner he did, Rehnquist badly
smudged the distinction between two different rules: (a) the rule
Miranda actually adopted, which only calls for the police to advise a
custodial suspect he has a right to a lawyer, and only grants him the right
to a lawyer if he asks for one, and (b) a rule which the Miranda Court
plainly rejected—one requiring the police to make sure that a custodial
suspect actually confers with a lawyer before he can be questioned.70
The distinction between these two rules is quite significant. As
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist should have known, or a member

64. See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 63, at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. (quoting from Justice Jackson’s opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting)).
70. See supra notes 24–27. In a way, Judge Friendly made the same mistake as future Justice
Rehnquist did. But Friendly was anticipating what the Warren Court might do when it handed down
Miranda. Rehnquist, on the other hand, was writing a memorandum about confessions
approximately three years after the Miranda case had been decided.
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of his staff should have informed him, only a year earlier a study of
police interrogation in Washington, D.C. had revealed that the great
majority of custodial suspects (a) sign waivers of their rights and (b) do
not ask to see a lawyer.71 More recent studies are to the same effect.72
VI. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER AND JUSTICE REHNQUIST
ADMINISTER THE FIRST BLOWS TO MIRANDA: THE
HARRIS AND TUCKER CASES
I have dwelt on Burger and Rehnquist because (a) they were probably
the two most “police-friendly” Justices in Supreme Court history and (b)
each played a prominent role in the downsizing and dismantling of
Miranda. Chief Justice Burger administered the first blow to Miranda in
Harris v. New York.73 Justice Rehnquist delivered the second blow in
Michigan v. Tucker.74
A.

Harris v. New York

In Harris, the police had obtained incriminating statements from the
defendant in violation of Miranda. The question presented was whether
the prosecution could impeach Mr. Harris’s credibility with these unMirandized statements when he took the stand in his own defense.
Writing for a 5-4 majority consisting of two Nixon appointees
(Blackmun and himself) and the three Miranda dissenters still on the
Court (Harlan, Stewart and White), the Chief Justice ruled that the
prosecution could impeach the defendant. The majority relied heavily on
Walder v. United States,75 which grew out of very different facts: Mr.
Walder’s testimony had been impeached by means of illegally seized
evidence relating to a different incident and one that had occurred two
years before his prosecution in the case that ultimately reached the
Supreme Court.
Moreover, the Chief Justice failed to make clear that the prosecution
was allowed to impeach Mr. Walder’s credibility only because when the
defendant testified in his own defense he “went beyond a mere denial of
71. Richard J. Medalie, Leonard Zeitz & Paul Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation’s Capital, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (1968).
72. See LEO, supra note 2, at 280–81; Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in
Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 792–93 (2006) (and
authorities collected therein).
73. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
74. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
75. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the
sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.”76
Nor is that all. In Walder, the prosecution had impeached the
defendant’s testimony as to collateral matters—not, as in Harris, with
incriminating statements by the defendant bearing directly on the crime
charged. As Professors Alan Dershowitz and John Hart Ely have pointed
out, there is a significant difference between the two situations: “[T]here
is a considerable risk that illegally obtained evidence which bears
directly on the crime charged [as it did in Harris] will be considered by
the jury as direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. This risk is
significantly reduced when the illegally obtained evidence does not
directly relate to the elements of crime charged [as was true in
Walder].”77
Although the Harris majority relied heavily on Walder, it neglected to
point out that Walder reminded us that “the Constitution guarantees a
defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him”78
and that the defendant “must be free to deny all the elements of the case
against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to [use]
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it.”79
When Mr. Harris took the stand in his own defense he did nothing to
waive his right to have the un-Mirandized statements excluded from his
cross-examination just as the defendant in the 1925 case of Agnello v.
United States80 had done nothing to waive his right to have the illegally
seized evidence excluded. Although one would never know this from
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Harris, if one reads Walder in
its entirety (as opposed to the extracts from the case that the Chief
Justice carefully selected) and one reads Agnello v. United States—
which the Chief Justice never once cited81—it becomes clear that
Agnello represents the general principle and that “the [Walder] Court
carved a narrow exception out of the Agnello principle.”82

76. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
77. Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1215–16 (1971)
(emphasis added).
78. Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
81. Not only did the Chief Justice neglect to cite Agnello even once, he “appears to have gone to
some pains to excise from [his] rendition of Walder all reference to Agnello.” Dershowitz & Ely,
supra note 77, at 1213.
82. Stone, supra note 9, at 108. To the same effect is Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 77, at 1211.
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Specific language in the Miranda opinion seemed to anticipate—and
resolve—the fact situation in Harris:
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any
manner . . . . In fact, statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his
testimony at trial . . . . These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the
full warnings and effective waiver required for any other
statement.83
But the Harris Court brushed off this language by noting that
discussion of the impeachment issue “was not at all necessary to the
Court’s holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.”84 As Professor
Stone has observed, however:
[M]iranda was deliberately structured to canvass a wide range
of problems, many of which were not directly raised by the
cases before the Court. This approach was thought necessary in
order to give “concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies
and courts to follow.” Thus, a technical reading of Miranda,
such as that employed in Harris, would enable the Court to label
many critical aspects of the decision mere dictum and therefore
not “controlling.”85
“To what extent,” asks Geoffrey Stone, “does the result in Harris
provide an incentive to police not to warn a suspect of his rights, in
violation of Miranda?”86 He answers:
The incentive would seem substantial . . . . [I]f the suspect [does
confess to the police without warnings and then] chooses to
testify at trial, the confession can be used to impeach and,
because of the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions, is likely
to be used as substantive evidence of guilt as well. On the other
hand, if the suspect attempts to avoid this dilemma by exercising
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966). Prior to Harris, most state and federal
courts of appeals addressing this issue had ruled that un-Mirandized statements were inadmissible
for impeachment purposes. See Stone, supra note 9, at 107.
84. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
85. See Stone, supra note 9, at 107–08. Chief Justice Warren spent fifty pages “discuss[ing] the
relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491,
before turning to the facts of the cases before the Court. Moreover, as pointed out in Dershowitz &
Ely, supra note 77, at 1210, the opinion “said that it was part of its ‘holding’ that an uncounseled
‘exculpatory’ statement could not be used by the prosecution” (emphasis added), referring to
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
86. Stone, supra note 9, at 112.
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his right not to testify at trial, the jury is likely, despite
cautionary instructions, to regard his silence as evidence of guilt.
Thus, for the police, it is virtually a no-lose situation.87
Finally, it should be noted that the Harris majority maintained that
Mr. Harris had never “claim[ed] that the statements [he] made to the
police were coerced or involuntary.”88 The best that can be said for this
misstatement of the record by the Court is that it is inexplicable. One
commentator put it more strongly:
This statement . . . is flatly untrue. At his trial, throughout the
state appellate proceedings, and in his brief and oral argument
before the Supreme Court, Harris consistently maintained that
his statements to the police were involuntary.89
Cases subsequent to Harris make clear that the use of an
“involuntary” or “coerced” statement for impeachment purposes is
forbidden.90 Thus, because of the Court’s misunderstanding of the
record, Mr. Harris was never able to show that the statements the police
obtained from him should have been excluded from his crossexamination. But this misunderstanding of the record is important for
another reason. It underscores the sloppiness characterizing the majority
opinion in Harris. How could the four Justices who joined the opinion of
the Court in Harris have done so without noticing the Chief Justice’s
mistake in discussing the record and without insisting that the record be
corrected? Where were their law clerks? For that matter, how could the
four Justices who joined the opinion of the Court in Harris have done so
without noticing that the Chief Justice had mangled the state of the law

87. Id. The Harris majority maintained that “the impeachment process here undoubtedly provided
valuable aid to the jury in assessing [the defendant’s] credibility, and the benefits of this process
should not be lost . . . because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will
be encouraged thereby.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added). It is possible the police might
not have decided on their own to exploit the opening that Harris afforded them. But in 1998
Professor Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998), reported that
litigation seeking to stop the California police from questioning custodial suspects after they had
asserted their Miranda rights had turned up a California police training videotape in which a
California deputy district attorney was instructing police officers to continue to question suspects
who had invoked their rights (a tactic known as questioning “outside Miranda”):
[I]f you get a statement “outside Miranda” and [the suspect] tells you that he did it and how he
did it . . . we can use [that] to impeach [him] . . . . [I]f the defendant . . . gets on the stand and
lies and says something different, we can use his “outside Miranda” statements to impeach
him . . . .
Id. at 191.
88. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
89. Stone, supra note 9, at 114; see also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 77, at 1201–08.
90. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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governing the impeachment use of statements inadmissible in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief?
Harris v. New York was an important decision in its own right.
Moreover, it was the first of a series of blows the post-Warren Court
dealt Miranda. But in announcing the decision, Chief Justice Burger did
his best to minimize the case’s significance.
The Washington Post reported that when he announced the decision,
Burger called it “a matter ‘of interest mostly to the bar’” and “not worth
describing from the bench.”91 The Los Angeles Times told its readers that
“[a]nnouncing the ruling, Burger seemed to minimize its significance by
not describing the case, only the vote breakdown.”92 The Chicago
Tribune noted that that “[c]ontrary to custom, the chief justice declined
to read highlights of his opinion from the bench.”93
Harris marked the beginning of the post-Warren Court’s piece-bypiece “overruling” of Miranda. But Harris did something else. It began
what recently has been called the “stealth overruling” of Miranda.94
B.

Michigan v. Tucker

When the Warren Court’s “revolution” in American criminal
procedure was at its height, Judge Henry Friendly complained about the
effect of “hard cases”—“the full consequences of decision may have
been clouded by understandable outrage over the facts at hand.”95 Judge
Friendly had in mind such cases as Mapp v. Ohio,96 Fay v. Noia,97 and
Escobedo v. Illinois,98 cases whose extreme facts favored the
defendant.99 But sometimes a case is a “hard case” because its facts are
tilted heavily in favor of the prosecution. Michigan v. Tucker is such a
case.
Mr. Tucker had been advised of his right to remain silent and his right
91. John P. MacKenzie, Court Eases Restraint on Confessions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1971, at
A1.
92. Ronald J. Ostrow, Court Limits Effect of the Miranda Decision on Defendant’s Rights, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1971, at 21.
93. Glen Elsasser, Ease Warren Curb on Police Quizzing, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1971, at 1.
94. Friedman, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
95. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS
235, 236 (1967). The text of this chapter was taken from Judge Friendly’s speech to the State Bar of
California on Sept. 23, 1965. Id.
96. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
98. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
99. See FRIENDLY, supra note 95, at 264 n.135.
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to counsel, but not of his right to the appointment of counsel if he were
indigent. The police questioning had occurred before the Miranda case
had been decided. Moreover, the defendant’s only complaint was that
the testimony of a witness for the prosecution should have been
excluded because the police had learned of the witness’s identity solely
as a result of the defendant’s un-Mirandized statements.
Concurring Justice Brennan would have resolved the matter in favor
of the prosecution by “confin[ing] the reach of Johnson v. New Jersey to
those cases in which the direct statements of an accused made during a
pre-Miranda interrogation were introduced at his post-Miranda trial.”100
But the Court (per Justice Rehnquist) rejected this approach.
Justice Rehnquist emphasized how narrow the question presented
was: The incriminating statements the defendant had “actually made” to
the police had been excluded at trial.101 “Whatever deterrent effect on
future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had,
we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the
testimony of the witness . . . as well.”102
Some of the comments made by Justice Rehnquist in the course of his
majority opinion are puzzling.
At one point he noted that “[c]ertainly no one could contend that the
interrogation faced by [the defendant] bore any resemblance to the
historical practices at which the right against compulsory selfincrimination was aimed.”103 This may be true, but why is Justice
Rehnquist telling us this? Certainly no one would contend that the police
interrogation experienced by Mr. Miranda or the defendants in
Miranda’s three companion cases resembled the historical practices at
which the Self-Incrimination Clause was aimed. For that matter, no one
would say that comment by the prosecution on a defendant’s failure to
take the stand or an instruction by the trial court that a defendant’s
silence is evidence of guilt—both prohibited by Griffin v. California104—
resembled the historical circumstances underlying the privilege.
At another place in his opinion, Justice Rehnquist observed that Mr.
Tucker’s statements to the police “could hardly be termed involuntary as
that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court.”105 Once again,
100. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 458 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall,
J.). For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 28–31.
101. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 444.
104. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
105. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445.
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this may be true, but what is its relevance? Mr. Miranda’s statements and
the statements of the defendants in Miranda’s three companion cases
could hardly be called “involuntary” as that term had been defined by
the Supreme Court in the pre-Miranda era. Nevertheless, they all
prevailed in the Supreme Court. Moreover, all four defendants probably
would have lost if they had been required to establish that their
incriminating statements were “coerced” or “involuntary.”
At still another point, Justice Rehnquist seemed to equate (a)
“compulsion” within the meaning of the privilege against selfincrimination and (b) “coercion” under the “voluntariness” test.106 This,
too, is puzzling. To be sure, “compulsion” and “coercion” have similar
meanings when one turns to the dictionary. But they have distinctly
different connotations when one takes into account their different
constitutional bases, legal history, and legal meaning.
As Victor Earle, a lawyer for a defendant in a companion case to
Miranda, emphasized in an exchange with Justice Harlan, much greater
pressures were necessary to render a confession “coerced” or
“involuntary” under the “voluntariness” test than are needed to make a
statement “compelled” within the meaning of the privilege.107
When asked by Justice Harlan whether he was contending that his
client’s statement was “coerced,” Mr. Earle replied that he did not think
the confession in his case was coerced “at all.”108 Nevertheless, Earle
expected to win his case—and he did. Perhaps Justice Harlan
remembered his exchange with Mr. Earle. In any event, in his dissenting
opinion in Miranda, Harlan recognized that “the privilege imposes more
exacting restrictions than does the Fourteenth Amendment’s
voluntariness test.”109
106. See id. at 444–46. According to Justice Rehnquist, the police conduct in Tucker violated
neither a defendant’s “privilege against self-incrimination as such” (as opposed to the “procedural
safeguards associated with that right”) nor the protection against “involuntary” confessions. See id.
at 444–45.
107. This part of the oral arguments in Miranda and its companion cases is reprinted in YALE
KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS &
QUESTIONS 569–70 (13th ed. 2012):
I don’t think [the confession in my case] was coerced at all. . . . I think there is a substantial
difference between [compelling someone to give up his Fifth Amendment privilege] and
coercing a confession. . . . [I]t is quite different to say that the privilege is cut down and
impaired by detention and to say a man’s will has been so overborne a confession is forced
from him. . . .
. . . [I]f we go back to the totality of circumstances [test], that means this Court will sit all by
itself as it has [for] so many years to overturn the few confessions it can take . . . The lower
courts won’t do their job. We need some specific guidelines . . . to help them along the way.
108. See id.
109. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and White, JJ.).
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It is hard to see how reading Miranda to say that the privilege is not
violated unless and until the pressures on the custodial suspect are strong
enough to render any statement obtained from him “coerced” under the
“voluntariness” test would make any sense. We already had a rule
barring the use of “coerced” or “involuntary” confessions (or
incriminating statements). If Miranda were to be read the way Justice
Rehnquist indicated, what would it have accomplished? It is no
exaggeration to say, as Geoffrey Stone has said:
Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion that there is a violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a statement is involuntary
under traditional standards is an outright rejection of the core
premises of Miranda . . . . [T]he conclusion that a violation of
Miranda is not a violation of the privilege is flatly inconsistent
with the Court’s declaration in Miranda that “[t]he requirement
of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect
to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”110
In some ways the most puzzling aspect of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
was his effort to drive a wedge between the privilege against selfincrimination and the Miranda rights. At various places in his opinion,
Rehnquist called the Miranda warnings “prophylactic rules,”
“prophylactic standards,” “procedural safeguards,” and “procedural
rules.”111 Does this make the Miranda rights “second-class rights” (if
they are constitutional rights at all)? At other places Rehnquist called
these rights “protective guidelines” and “recommended ‘procedural
safeguards.’”112 Does this mean they are “third-class” rights?
Not only did Justice Rehnquist indicate that the Miranda rights were
not required, but he told us that the Warren Court itself had “recognized”
as much:
The [Miranda] Court recognized that these procedural
safeguards [the Miranda rules] were not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was
protected. As the Court remarked: “[W]e cannot say that the
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted.”113

110. Stone, supra note 9, at 118–19 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
111. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439, 443–46.
112. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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Justice Rehnquist’s quotation from Miranda is incomplete—and quite
misleading. Once Miranda was decided, the police could no longer
conduct the proceedings in the interrogation room the way they did in
the so-called “good old days.” Some new safeguards were
constitutionally required. Because “[t]he current practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with” the privilege against selfincrimination,114 the police could not stand pat.
Requiring all custodial interrogations to occur in the presence of a
neutral judicial magistrate might sufficiently reduce the “inherently
compelling pressures [of in-custody interrogation] which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely.”115 A requirement that the
police videotape all custodial interrogation might prove to be an
“adequate protective device . . . to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings.”116
However, in the absence of any other protective device—and, as
dissenting Justice Douglas noted in Tucker, there was no contention that
any other means for safeguarding the privilege was in place117—the
Miranda warnings were required.
Justice Rehnquist did quote language from Miranda in Tucker, but he
ended his quotations too soon. In the very same paragraph from Miranda
that Rehnquist quoted, Chief Justice Warren went on to say:
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it,
the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be
observed.118
As Geoffrey Stone has pointed out:
As even [Rehnquist] conceded, [the Miranda Court] thought that
the privilege against self-incrimination offered “a more
comprehensive and less subjective protection”119 than the Due
Process Clause which had been the basis of the traditional
voluntariness test . . . . [Justice Rehnquist’s] conclusion that a
violation of Miranda is not a violation of the privilege is flatly

114. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
115. Id. at 467.
116. Id. at 458.
117. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 463.
118. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
119. Stone, supra note 9, at 118–19 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 442–43).
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inconsistent with the Court’s declaration in Miranda that “[t]he
requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”120 . . . If [the
Miranda] safeguards are not derived from the Constitution,
whence do they spring? . . . Since the Court has no supervisory
power over the states, the Rehnquist analysis, if taken seriously,
would seem in practical effect to overrule Miranda.121
Three decades later, the Court finally directed its attention to the
federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda. As it turned out, not even
Chief Justice Rehnquist took the Rehnquist analysis in Tucker seriously.
He wrote the opinion of the Court for a 7-2 majority invalidating the
statute.122
However, as far as Miranda supporters were concerned, Rehnquist’s
analysis of Miranda in Tucker, and his failure in Dickerson to question
the soundness of cases that built on Tucker, did do considerable damage:
earlier cases had downsized Miranda on the premise that a violation of
Miranda is not a violation of a constitutional right, but only a
“prophylactic rule” designed to implement a constitutional right.123
Although these earlier cases seemed to be based on the view that
Miranda was not a constitutional decision, their significance has not
been diminished one whit. Despite the invalidation of the federal statute,
the downsizing of Miranda brought about by these earlier cases remains
in place today.124
Although one would never have known this from Justice Rehnquist’s
discussion of (and quotations from) Miranda in his Tucker opinion, not
once in his sixty-page opinion of the Court did Chief Justice Warren call
the Miranda rights prophylactic rules or procedural safeguards. What is
probably more significant, not once did any of the Miranda dissenters
complain that the majority opinion represented an “extraconstitutional”
or “illegitimate” exercise of the Supreme Court’s authority to review
state-court judgments.125
120. Id. at 119 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
121. Id. at 119–20.
122. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
123. See especially Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (Justice O’Connor writing for the
majority); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority).
124. See infra notes 210–27.
125. At this point, I am borrowing language from Justice Scalia, who wrote a forceful dissent in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 528 (2000), the case that reaffirmed the constitutionality of
Miranda. Id. at 461, 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At two places in his Miranda dissenting opinion,
Justice White did refer to the majority’s “per se approach” or use of “per se rule,” Miranda, 384
U.S. at 539, 544 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.), but he did not suggest
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Although Justice Rehnquist’s way of thinking about Miranda in his
Tucker opinion finds little support in either the majority or dissenting
opinions in Miranda itself, a 1969 Department of Justice (DOJ)
memorandum126 (written when Rehnquist headed the Office of Legal
Counsel) is another matter.
In an effort to defend the constitutionality of § 3501 (the federal law
purporting to abolish Miranda),127 the 1969 DOJ memorandum drew a
distinction between (a) “constitutional absolutes,” such as the privilege
against self-incrimination,128 and (b) what the memorandum called “a
means, suggested by the Court, by which the accused’s Fifth
Amendment privilege may be safeguarded in the custodial situation”129
or “a protective safeguard system suggested by the Court.”130
There does not seem to be much distance between the way Justice
Rehnquist analyzed Miranda in Tucker and how the Justice Department
viewed Miranda in its 1969 memorandum: The DOJ distinguished
“constitutional absolutes” from mere “procedural safeguards.”131
Rehnquist distinguished the “right against compulsory selfincrimination” itself (which cannot be violated) from “prophylactic rules
developed to protect that right”132 (which can be violated under certain
this was “extraconstitutional” or “illegitimate.”
Justice White’s characterization of the Miranda rights as per se rules is interesting. As one
commentator has observed, the kind of decision-making the Warren Court utilized did lead it to turn
to “broad, legislative-like directives, sometimes called ‘flat’ or ‘per se’ rules.” Allen, supra note 43,
at 532. The main advantages of such rules are that they “give relatively certain guidance to the
lower courts” and “are applicable to a great mass of cases at the trial court levels without direct
involvement of the Supreme Court.” Id. As Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Miranda
illustrates, the Justices do not always distinguish between “prophylactic” rules and what are
variously called “flat” or “bright-line” or “administratively based per se rules.” But 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.9(g), 2.9(h) (3d ed. 2007) does distinguish between
these two types of rules:
Where rules are described as “prophylactic,” the Court indicates its willingness to accept
equally effective safeguards adopted by the state or federal government. . . . When rules are
described as setting forth a “per se” or “bright line” standard, they arguably are presented as a
direct reading of the constitutional command at issue and not a standard that the state can
replace with an adequate alternative . . . .
Id. § 2.9(h) at 806 n.214.
126. Memorandum from the Department of Justice to United States Attorneys (June 11, 1969), in
5 CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 2350 (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs ed. 1969) [hereinafter Memorandum to
U.S. Attorneys].
127. See supra notes 34–41.
128. Memorandum to U.S. Attorneys, supra note 126, at 2351–52.
129. Id. at 2351.
130. Id. at 2352.
131. Id. at 2351–52.
132. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
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circumstances). The DOJ talks about “a protective safeguard system
suggested by the Court”133 and Rehnquist speaks of “procedural
safeguards” “recommended” by the Miranda Court.134
What role, if any, did then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist play
in the writing of the 1969 Justice memorandum? We do not know. But it
is hard to believe that Rehnquist played no role at all.
At the time the DOJ memorandum was written, Rehnquist headed the
Office of Legal Counsel, and it was not unusual for that office to write
(or at least contribute to the writing) of such memoranda. Nor is that all.
Rehnquist was so unhappy with Miranda that only two months earlier he
had written a memorandum to John Dean proposing a way to get rid of
that famous case.135 Moreover, Attorney General John Mitchell knew
how strongly Rehnquist felt about Miranda because, as Mr. Dean has
told us,136 Dean and Mitchell had met to discuss whether or not to carry
out Rehnquist’s proposal.
There is another reason to believe that future Justice Rehnquist
contributed to the writing of the DOJ memorandum. As John Dean
recently told me, because the memorandum was addressed to all U.S.
Attorneys and Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was the
person who supervised these attorneys at the time, “[the] memo would
have been prepared with the approval of Kleindienst.”137 “[G]iven the
close relationship between Kleindienst and Rehnquist, it would be very
surprising if Rehnquist was not behind this action. It was Kleindienst, of
course, who brought Rehnquist into the DOJ, and who relied on him
heavily.”138
VII. “PROPHYLACTIC RULES” VS. CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Miranda was not the only time the Court dealt with “prophylactic
rules.” The Court also promulgated such rules in a line of cases
beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce.139 Pearce arose as follows: a
number of defendants had overturned their original convictions only to
receive longer sentences when they were retried and reconvicted. There

133. Memorandum to U.S. Attorneys, supra note 126, at 2352 (emphasis added).
134. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added).
135. See supra notes 63–70.
136. See supra note 63.
137. E-mail from John Dean, former Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., to author (Sept. 20, 2011) (on
file with author).
138. Id.
139. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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was reason to believe that in some instances at least these defendants
were being punished for managing to overturn their earlier convictions.
But it would be “extremely difficult” to prove this in any individual
case.140
What was the Pearce Court’s solution? Establishing what has come to
be known as a “presumption of vindictiveness:”141 “[W]henever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the
reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear . . . [and] must be
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentence
proceeding.”142
Several years later, the Court had become so comfortable with
Miranda’s prophylactic rules that a 7-2 majority explained and defended
“the Pearce prophylactic rules” by analogizing them to the Miranda
rules:
[T]he Pearce prophylactic rules assist in guaranteeing the
propriety of the sentencing phase of the criminal process. In this
protective role, Pearce is analogous to Miranda, . . . in which
the Court established rules to govern police practices during
custodial interrogations in order to safeguard the rights of the
accused and to assure the reliability of statements made during
these interrogations. Thus, the prophylactic rules in Pearce and
Miranda are similar in that each was designed to preserve the
integrity of a phase of the criminal process.143
As Susan Klein has persuasively argued, constitutional-criminal
procedure is filled with what might be called “prophylactic rules.”144 Nor
are these rules limited to criminal procedure. As David Strauss has
shown, the famous case of New York Times v. Sullivan145 (and other First
Amendment cases) may plausibly be read as adopting prophylactic rules
as well.146

140. Id. at 725 n.20.
141. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 881 (5th ed.
2008).
142. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
143. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (per Powell, J.). The 7-2 majority included Chief
Justice Burger and future Chief Justice Rehnquist.
144. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001).
145. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
146. David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 965–66
(2001).
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As for the characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule that
“goes beyond” the Constitution:
[This notion] seems to rest on the premise that a case-by-case
inquiry into voluntariness is somehow natural, or is found in the
Constitution, so that any deviation from that approach is judicial
lawmaking of questionable legitimacy. But the Constitution does
not ordain any particular institutional mechanism for ensuring
that compelled statements are not admitted into evidence. The
case-by-case voluntariness approach is just one such
mechanism. The Supreme Court has to decide if it is the right
mechanism.147
If one calls the Miranda rules “prophylactic,” notes Evan Caminker,
“one might fairly ask: compared to what? The obvious answer is
‘compared to the case-specific-voluntariness test.’”148 But that test is no
more “directly compelled” by the Constitution than Miranda itself.149
The due process/“totality of the circumstances”/“voluntariness” test
for the admissibility of confessions cannot be called a requirement of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, because that Clause did not apply to the states
until 1964150—long after the Supreme Court had started using the test.
Moreover, the Self-Incrimination Clause did not apply to the police
station until Miranda was handed down in 1966. Finally, one will search
the Constitution in vain for any mention of any of the key words or
terms used to decide “voluntariness” cases—such as “coerced,”
“involuntary,” “totality of the circumstances,” and “breaking” or
“overbearing” the will. So why is the prohibition against “involuntary”
confessions (as opposed to the protection furnished by Miranda)
considered a “core constitutional right?”
I believe there is a good deal to be said for Dean Caminker’s proposal
that “we jettison the phrase ‘prophylactic rule’ from our vocabulary,
because there really isn’t any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic
rule that is in any important way distinguishable from the more run-ofthe-mill doctrine that courts routinely establish and implement regarding
every constitutional norm.”151 Moreover, “to the extent one purports to
use the adjective pejoratively, it inappropriately raises concerns of

147. Id. at 963.
148. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1, 26 (2001).
149. Id.
150. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
151. Caminker, supra note 148, at 25.
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legitimacy where none should exist.”152
However, as long as “prophylactic rule” does remain part of our
vocabulary, it is noteworthy that in Edwards v. Arizona,153 a majority of
the Burger Court essentially established a new “prophylactic rule” that
built on Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.” Edwards held that when a
custodial suspect invokes his right to a lawyer, he may not be subjected
to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him—
unless he himself initiates further discussion with the police. Edwards
held, in effect, that when a custodial suspect asserts his right to counsel,
there is a conclusive presumption that any subsequent waiver of rights
that comes at police instigation is compelled.154
Nor is that all. A decade later, in Minnick v. Mississippi,155 a majority
of the Rehnquist Court—over a strong protest by dissenting Justice
Scalia that this “is the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon
prophylaxis”156—expanded the Edwards rule still further. The Court
held that “when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and
officials may not reinstate interrogation without counsel present,
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney”157 in the
meantime. Speaking for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy observed:
[The Edwards rule] ensures that any statement made [by a
suspect who has previously asserted his right to counsel] is not
the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial
resources which would otherwise be expended in making
difficult determinations of voluntariness, and implements the
protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward
terms. . . . [The] rule provides “clear and unequivocal”
guidelines to the law enforcement profession.158
This explanation and defense of Edwards strikes me as an explanation
and defense of Miranda as well.

152. Id.
153. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards is one of the few times in the last forty years that the
Supreme Court gave Miranda a generous reading.
154. It will not do to say that Miranda required the Edwards rule. The Court had held earlier that
if a suspect asserts his “right to silence” (as opposed to his right to counsel) the police are permitted
(if they cease questioning on the spot) to try again and succeed at a subsequent interrogation. See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court could have plausibly held that invocation of the
right to counsel should be treated no differently than the assertion of the right to silence.
155. 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (per Kennedy, J.).
156. Id. at 166 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
157. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 151. Only Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

THE RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL (?) OF MIRANDA

995

VIII. THE COURT WEAKENS THE EDWARDS RULE
The Supreme Court giveth, but the Supreme Court also taketh away.
Although Edwards marked a significant victory for Miranda, and the
Court went on to strengthen Edwards in some respects, it also weakened
it in other ways. A good example is Oregon v. Bradshaw.159
The police believed that Mr. Bradshaw’s drinking had brought about
the death of a minor. After being arrested, Bradshaw invoked his right to
counsel. A few moments later, while being taken to the jail, Bradshaw
asked the accompanying officer: “Well, what is going to happen to me
now?”
This question led to a discussion about the minor’s death, during
which time the officer reiterated his own theory of how Bradshaw’s
drinking had caused this. The officer then persuaded the suspect to agree
to take a lie detector test the next day, at which time the suspect
confessed.160
Writing for a four-Justice plurality,161 Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the suspect’s question as to what was going to happen to him next
evinced “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about
the investigation.”162 This conclusion appears to be quite a stretch. It
seems much more likely that, as the four dissenters argued,163 Bradshaw
was simply manifesting anxiety and that his only desire was to find out
where the police were taking him next or what was going to happen to
him next.
Even though a suspect clearly invokes his or her right to counsel, the
police still have some room to maneuver. When the officer responds to a
suspect’s specific question about what is going to happen next, by telling
the suspect where he is being taken, or when he will be meeting with an
attorney or phoning his or her spouse, this should not count as “police
interrogation.” But when the officer’s response goes beyond the scope of
the suspect’s question—when the officer exploits the situation as seems
to have occurred in Bradshaw—that should count as “police
interrogation,” conduct barred by Edwards.
Under such circumstances, the suspect did not change his or her mind
about wanting to talk to a lawyer. The police did. The suspect did not
159. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
160. Id. at 1042.
161. Concurring Justice Powell provided the fifth vote. He agreed that Bradshaw had effectively
waived his right to counsel, but saw no need for the plurality’s two-step analysis.
162. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045–46.
163. See id. at 1055–56.
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“initiate” or “invite” conversation about the strengths or weaknesses of
his case. The police did. Therefore, the police conduct should be viewed
as “police interrogation”—prohibited by Edwards.
A decade later, the Court weakened the Edwards rule in another
respect. In Davis v. United States,164 it tried to draw a bright line
between those suspects who “clearly” assert their right to counsel
(thereby gaining the protection of Edwards) and those who only make an
ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney that might (or might
not) be considered an invocation of the right to counsel. (E.g., “I think
maybe I should ask for a lawyer at this point, don’t you?” or “Maybe the
time has come for me to ask for a lawyer?” or “Do you think I need an
attorney here?”)
As Janet Ainsworth pointed out, a year before the Davis case was
decided, women and members of a number of minority racial and ethnic
groups are far more likely than other groups to avoid strong, assertive
means of expression and to use indirect and hedged speech patterns that
give the impression of uncertainty or equivocality.165 Unfortunately,
however, in determining whether suspects have effectively invoked the
right to counsel, a majority of the lower courts have acted on the premise
that “direct and assertive speech . . . is, or should be, the norm.”166
Moreover, since the custodial police interrogation environment involves
an “imbalance of power” between suspects and their interrogators, such
an environment increases the likelihood that a suspect will adopt an
indirect or hedged—and thus ambiguous—means of expression.167
More recently, after studying state and federal cases for twelve years,
Marcy Strauss reported that only one out of five suspects’ statements
were found to constitute unambiguous requests for counsel.168 Professor
Strauss found “the use of questions, hedges and imprecise language in
the custodial interrogation setting . . . very common among all
suspects.”169 As for police interrogators, they not only “ignore
ambiguous requests,” but “frequently use them to subtly or overtly
encourage suspects to waive their right to counsel.”170
164. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
165. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
166. Id. at 315.
167. See id. at 285–88.
168. Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1047,
1055 (2007).
169. Id. at 1057.
170. Id. at 1060.
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IX. THE COURT DISPARAGES MIRANDA: QUARLES AND
ELSTAD
To many supporters of Miranda, however, how grudgingly the Court
construed Edwards was not as disturbing as how unwilling the Court
was to treat Miranda as a constitutional doctrine. A good example is
New York v. Quarles.171
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Rehnquist contrasted Miranda with
“traditional due process standards.”172 Under the circumstances, he told
us, the suspect could not invoke Miranda—but he was “certainly free on
remand” to rely on the voluntariness test.173
Quarles grew out of the following facts: shortly after midnight, the
police apprehended defendant in the rear of a supermarket. He matched
the description of a man who had just committed a rape. According to
the victim, the man had been carrying a gun. When the police discovered
the suspected rapist was wearing an empty shoulder holster, they asked
him where his gun was and he pointed to some cartons (where the
weapon was found).
The questions about the gun’s location were not preceded by any
warnings.174 The Court told us, however, that that did not matter.
Because “public safety” was at stake, the police were justified in failing
to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights.175
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist seemed to take
considerable pains to avoid calling Miranda a constitutional ruling or a
doctrine required by the Constitution. At one point, he referred to the
Miranda warnings as “the procedural safeguards associated with the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda;”176 at
another place he called Miranda “the prophylactic rule protecting the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”177
A year after the Quarles case came Oregon v. Elstad.178 Mr. Elstad
was suspected of burglary. When questioned at his own home, a police
officer failed to advise him of his rights. Elstad then made an
incriminating statement. (The prosecution subsequently conceded that
171. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
172. Id. at 655 n.5.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 652–53.
175. See id. at 655–60.
176. Id. at 655.
177. Id. at 657.
178. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

998

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

[Vol. 87:965

this statement was inadmissible.)179
When brought to the police station, Mr. Elstad was advised of his
rights. He waived them and signed a written confession.180 Since his
incriminating statement had been excluded by the trial court, the only
question presented was whether the written confession itself was
admissible. Mr. Elstad maintained that the written confession was fatally
“tainted” by the statement the police had obtained from him before he
arrived at the stationhouse. A 7-2 majority, per Justice O’Connor,
disagreed.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court, which relies heavily on
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Tucker181 and Quarles, is quite
remarkable—especially when one looks back at her opinion today.
Fifteen years later, in the Dickerson case,182 Justice O’Connor would
join a 7-2 majority opinion, one telling us that “Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by
an Act of Congress.”183 In the 1985 Elstad case, however (writing for
another 7-2 majority), Justice O’Connor made at least nine statements to
the effect that the Miranda doctrine (unlike the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule or exclusion stemming from a violation of the Fifth
Amendment itself) is neither a “constitutional decision” nor a violation
of any specific provision of the Constitution:
(1) “[Metaphors, such as the ‘tainted fruit of the poisonous tree’]
should not be used to obscure fundamental differences
between the role of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule and the function of Miranda . . . .”184
(2) “The Oregon court assumed and respondent here contends that a
failure to administer Miranda warnings necessarily breeds the
same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional
right . . . . We believe this view misconstrues the nature of the
protections afforded by Miranda warnings and therefore
misreads the consequences of police failure to supply them.”185
(3) “Respondent’s contention that his confession was tainted by the
earlier failure of the police to provide Miranda warnings and

179. Id. at 300–02.
180. Id. at 301–02.
181. See supra notes 101–22.
182. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
183. Id. at 432.
184. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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must be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ assumes the
existence of a constitutional violation. . . . But as we explained
in [earlier cases], a procedural Miranda violation differs in
significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment,
which have traditionally mandated a broad application of the
‘fruits’ doctrine.”186
(4) “The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation.”187
(5) “[U]nwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded
from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case,
Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm.”188
(6) “[T]he Miranda presumption [of coercion] . . . does not require
that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently
tainted. . . . [T]he Tucker Court noted that neither the general
goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be
served by suppression of the witness’ testimony. . . . We believe
that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleged
‘fruit’ of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness
nor an article of evidence but the accused’s own voluntary
testimony. As in Tucker, the absence of any coercion or
improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness
and deterrence—for a broader rule.”189
(7) “If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering
the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the
same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the
Fifth Amendment itself.”190
(8) “There is a vast difference between the direct consequences
flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or
other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will and

186. Id. at 305–06 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
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the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’
freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive
question, as in this case.”191
(9) “We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or
improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact
that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not
warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given
a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to
remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier
statement.”192
X.

WHAT WAS THE MIRANDA COURT TRYING TO DO?

Friedrich Nietzsche once observed that the commonest stupidity
consists of forgetting what one is trying to do.193 When the Supreme
Court decided Miranda, what was it trying to do?
It was trying to change the way the police did business. Now that the
privilege against self-incrimination applied to the interrogation room as
well as the courtroom, the police could no longer say or imply that they
had a right to an answer or the authority to compel one. (It would be
more accurate to say that the police never had the right to an answer or
the lawful authority to compel one; they only led suspects to believe they
did.)
Moreover, now that the privilege applies to the interrogation room,
the police can no longer say or imply that suspects will be “better off” if
they “cooperate” with the police and “worse off” if they do not. Nor is
that all. Now that the right to counsel applies to police interrogation
(even the right to a lawyer at state expense if a suspect cannot afford to
pay for one), the police cannot lead a suspect to believe that he or she
must confront the police “all alone” for an indefinite period of time.

191. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
193. In L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1),
46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936), the authors refer to “Nietzsche’s observation, that the most common
stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do.” Unfortunately, the authors do not provide a
source. According to the University of Michigan Law School Faculty Services Librarian, Seth
Quidachay-Swan, the Fuller-Purdue reference to Nietzsche has made their version of the quote the
basis for its current form. Mr. Quidachay- Swan adds that in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL
TOO HUMAN (R.J. Hollingdale trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1878), Nietzsche does say:
“During the journey we commonly forget its goal. . . . Forgetting our objectives is the most frequent
of all acts of stupidity.” Id. at 360.
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It is never easy to get the police to change their conduct. It is much
harder, however, when they have a strong incentive to continue to
operate as usual. Elstad provides such an incentive.
How can we expect the police to take Miranda seriously when they
are aware that even though they disregard Miranda, the state will be able
to use the testimony of any witness or any physical evidence that their
misconduct brings to light? Unfortunately, the Elstad majority forgot the
warning in Nardone that “[t]o forbid the direct use of methods . . . but to
put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods
deemed ‘inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
liberty.’”194
Shortly after Miranda was handed down, Judge Henry Friendly
recognized that “‘what data there are’ suggest that the obtaining of leads
with which to obtain real or demonstrative evidence or prosecution
witnesses is more important than getting statements for use in court.”195
Some will retort, however, that although lawyers and law review writers
may think this way, the average police officer does not. But the police
do not have to think this way on their own so long as their instructors
train them to think this way. Evidently they do.
More than a decade ago (and it is fair to assume that since then this
“training” has spread), Professor Charles Weisselberg reported that
many California police officers were being encouraged to question
“outside Miranda,” i.e., continue to question custodial suspects despite
the fact that they had directly and unambiguously asserted their rights.196
According to one training videotape, for example, a California deputy
district attorney instructs the police as follows:
The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . doesn’t have a fruits of the
poisonous tree attached to it the way constitutional violations
do. . . . [When we question someone who has invoked his
Miranda rights,] [a]ll we lose is the statements taken in violation
of Miranda. We do not lose physical evidence that resulted from
that. We do not lose the testimony of other witnesses that we

194. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (per Frankfurter, J.).
195. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 712 n.176 (1968). A quarter-century later, another commentator indicated that
nothing had changed. See David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear
Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 845 (1992) (“Expert interrogators have long recognized, and continue
to instruct, that a confession is a primary source for determining the existence and whereabouts of
the fruits of a crime, such as documents or weapons.”).
196. See Weisselberg, supra note 87, at 188.
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learned about only by violating his Miranda invocation.197
True, most custodial suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to
the police. But if suspects do assert their rights, why would a determined
police officer stop questioning? The officer is aware that the
incriminating statements themselves must be excluded. But he is also
aware—perhaps instructed not to forget—that any physical evidence or
testimony obtained from heretofore unknown witnesses may still be
admissible.
After Quarles and Elstad were decided, Miranda supporters still had
one remaining hope: sooner or later the Supreme Court would have to
decide the constitutionality of a 1968 federal statute widely known as
§ 3501, a statute which purported to abolish Miranda.198 If and when the
Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional, thereby reaffirming (or
resuscitating) the constitutionality of Miranda, the premise on which
such cases as Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad were based would shatter.
And the conclusions these cases had arrived at would topple. (Although
it did not turn out this way, it was a reasonable expectation that
considering Miranda a “constitutional decision” once again would lead
to the collapse of such cases as Elstad.)
XI. THE STRANGE CASE OF DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES
Fifteen years after Elstad was decided, the Court handed down
Dickerson v. United States,199 the case that finally did address the
constitutionality of § 3501. Surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who
up to this point had probably never had a kind word to say about
Miranda) came to Miranda’s rescue. Equally surprisingly, however, the
Chief Justice could find no fault with such cases as Tucker, Quarles, and
Elstad, cases that had led many to believe that Miranda was not, or was
no longer considered, a constitutional decision.
When the Chief Justice discussed these cases, he treated them quite
gingerly. Indeed, he was careful to leave them completely unscathed.

197. The full transcript of the videotape is reprinted in an appendix to Professor Weisselberg’s
article. See Weisselberg, supra note 87, at 189–92. At the time the training tape was made it was not
perfectly clear that physical evidence discovered as a result of a failure to follow Miranda, as well
as a “second confession” following a Miranda violation, would be admissible. But the California
district attorney turned out to be right. The lower courts “almost uniformly ruled” that Elstad
applied to physical evidence. See Wollin, supra note 195, at 835–36. And the Supreme Court
ultimately agreed. See infra notes 216–26.
198. Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999), with Kamisar, supra note 39.
199. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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I believe Don Dripps spoke for many criminal procedure professors
when he commented:
[Once the Court granted certiorari in Dickerson, Court-watchers]
knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to
either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases,
or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of
precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
doesn’t “have to” do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once
again reminds us.200
Because the Department of Justice would not defend the
constitutionality of § 3501, the Court appointed Professor Paul Cassell to
do so. Although I usually discount the complaints of losing counsel, this
time, I believe, there is a good deal to be said for losing counsel’s
reaction.
When he read the opinion in Dickerson shortly after it was sent to him
from the clerk’s office, Cassell’s “immediate reaction” was “Where’s the
rest of the opinion?”201 Cassell had been so taken aback by the Chief
Justice’s “cursory treatment” of the “deconstitutionalization” of
Miranda, a treatment that Cassell understandably believes “leaves
Miranda doctrine incoherent,” that he couldn’t help thinking that “some
glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the
critical issues in the case.”202
As discussed earlier, Elstad was an especially difficult case to
reconcile with the Dickerson view that Miranda was a “constitutional
decision.” Dissenting Justice Scalia was well aware of this and hit the
Dickerson majority hard on this point. Scalia maintained, and I believe
he was quite right, that “[t]he proposition that failure to comply with
Miranda’s rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central
to the holdings” of such cases as Elstad203—indeed, constituted “[t]he
only reasoned basis for their outcome.”204
How did Chief Justice Rehnquist handle Justice Scalia’s complaint? If
ever there were a half-hearted response, it was Rehnquist’s:
Our decision in [Elstad]—refusing to apply the traditional
200. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and
the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (2001).
201. See Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failure in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001).
202. Id.
203. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.) (first emphasis
added).
204. Id. at 455.
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“fruits” doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases—does
not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but
simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment.205
Justice Scalia called the Chief Justice’s response “true but supremely
unhelpful.”206 One commentator, with good reason, put it more strongly:
Rehnquist’s “non-answer to the question of why the traditional fruits
doctrine . . . does not apply to Miranda violations . . . comes
dangerously close to being a non sequitur.”207
In the Tucker case, then-Justice Rehnquist became the first member of
the Court in a case involving Miranda to distinguish between statements
that were actually “coerced” or “compelled” and those obtained merely
in violation of Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.”208 A quarter-century
later, however, when he wrote his majority opinion in Dickerson, the
Chief Justice was careful never to refer to the Miranda rules as
“prophylactic.”209 On the other hand, Rehnquist did work hard in
Dickerson to avoid undermining any of the earlier cases that had carved
out exceptions to Miranda on the premise that the landmark case was not
(or was no longer regarded as) a constitutional decision.
Only a few years after Dickerson was handed down, however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined two plurality opinions by Justice Thomas that
read as if Dickerson had never been written: Chavez v. Martinez210 and
United States v. Patane.211 In Martinez, Justice Thomas contrasted
“prophylactic rules” such as Miranda rights with “core constitutional
right[s]” such as the Self-Incrimination Clause.212 In Patane, Thomas
characterized Miranda as a “prophylactic employed to protect against
violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”213 He also reminded us that
prophylactic rules such as Miranda “necessarily sweep beyond the
205. Id. at 441.
206. Id. at 455.
207. Klein, supra note 144, at 1073.
208. See supra notes 102–21.
209. See generally Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States: The Case that Disappointed
Miranda’s Critics—and Then Its Supporters, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig M. Bradley ed.
2006).
210. 538 U.S. 760 (2003). Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in its entirety and in large part by Justices O’Connor and Scalia.
211. 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s
plurality opinion. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the judgment.
212. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 770.
213. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636.
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actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”214
It is hard not to sympathize with Judge Ebel, the Tenth Circuit judge
who excluded the physical evidence in Patane only to be reversed by the
Supreme Court. Mr. Patane had been arrested outside his home and
handcuffed. A federal agent, who had been informed that Patane, a
convicted felon, illegally possessed a Glock pistol, failed to give him a
complete set of Miranda warnings. As a result, the government
conceded that any statements Patane made about the location of the
Glock had to be excluded. But it insisted that the Glock itself (found
where the defendant said it was, on a wooden shelf in his bedroom)
should be admissible. The government relied heavily on two preDickerson cases, Tucker and Elstad. But speaking for a unanimous
three-judge panel, Judge Ebel made short work of these cases:
[B]oth [Tucker and Elstad] were predicated upon the premise
that the Miranda rule was a prophylactic rule, rather than a
constitutional rule. . . . However, the premise upon which
Tucker and Elstad relied was fundamentally altered in Dickerson
[where] the Supreme Court declared that Miranda articulated a
constitutional rule rather than merely a prophylactic one. Thus,
Dickerson undermined the logic underlying Tucker and
Elstad.215
Some judges might have stopped at this point, but evidently Judge
Ebel could not do so. He continued:
Further, the rule urged upon us by the Government appears to
make little sense as a matter of policy. From a practical
perspective, we see little difference between the confessional
statement “The Glock is in my bedroom on a shelf,” which even
the Government concedes is clearly excluded under
Miranda . . . and the Government’s introduction of the Glock
found in the defendant’s bedroom on the shelf as a result of his

214. Id. at 639. In a companion case to Patane, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), a 5-4
majority, per Souter, J., did exclude a “second confession.” But Seibert grew out of egregious facts:
The principal police interrogator had admittedly been trained to use a two-stage interrogation
technique designed to circumvent Miranda. At the first questioning session with the defendant the
police interrogator deliberately failed to give any warnings at all—which he had been trained to do.
Moreover, the statement ultimately admitted into evidence was “largely a repeat” of the statement
the police had obtained during the first questioning session.
Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote in Seibert. He left little doubt that he (1) approved Elstad’s
reasoning; (2) believed that Elstad had been unaffected by Dickerson; and (3) would admit the
incriminating statement obtained during the second questioning session in a less egregious “second
confession” case.
215. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
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unconstitutionally obtained confession. If anything, to adopt the
Government’s rule would allow it to make greater use of the
confession than merely introducing the words themselves.216
In reversing the Tenth Circuit opinion in Patane, Justice Thomas took
account of Judge Ebel’s observation that the position advocated by the
government “appears to make little sense as a matter of policy.”217
“[P]utting policy aside,” retorted Thomas, “we have held that ‘[t]he
word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the SelfIncrimination Clause to testimonial evidence.”218
In the context of the Patane case, Justice Thomas’s statement is
misleading. Mr. Patane had not been ordered to put on a hat to see
whether it fit properly.219 Nor had he been required to provide a blood
sample to test for its alcoholic content.220 What Mr. Patane was
complaining about was the use of evidence derived from an
incriminating statement. Ever since the 120-year-old case of
Counselman v. Hitchcock221 was decided (a case Justice Thomas never
mentions), it has been clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause protects
against the derivative use of compelled testimony as well as the
compelled testimony itself.
Evidently, Justice Thomas refuses to believe that a statement violates
the privilege simply because the police officer who obtained it from a
custodial suspect failed to comply with Miranda. But that was what
Dickerson was supposed to be all about—and Justices Scalia and
Thomas lost, 7-2. The Dickerson majority informed us that once the
Self-Incrimination Clause was held to apply to the interrogation room
“something more than the [pre-Miranda] totality [of circumstances] test
was necessary”222—that because “§ 3501 reinstates the totality test as
sufficient” it “cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.”223
What Justice Thomas had to say about Miranda in the post-Dickerson
era should not have come as a great surprise. After all, Justice Thomas
did join Justice Scalia’s forceful dissent in Dickerson. But how could
Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of the majority opinion in
216. Id. at 1027 (emphasis in original).
217. Patane, 542 U.S. at 643.
218. Id. at 643–44.
219. Cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (requiring a person to put on a blouse is not a
violation of the privilege).
220. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (not a violation of the privilege).
221. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
222. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 442–43.
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Dickerson—join Justice Thomas’s opinions in Martinez and Patane?
How could Rehnquist agree that Miranda was not a constitutional
decision after all?
It was almost as if Chief Justice Rehnquist had (a) written his
opinions in Tucker and Quarles when he was quite healthy; (b) written
the majority opinion in Dickerson when he was suffering from amnesia;
and (c) recovered fully from his amnesia when he joined Justice
Thomas’s opinions in Martinez and Patane.
As might be expected, many theories have been advanced to explain
Rehnquist’s surprising vote in Dickerson.224 One of the most interesting
theories is that the Chief Justice decided to vote with the majority so that
he could assign the opinion to himself rather than let it go to someone
like Justice Stevens.225 Some people may find this theory disturbing. But
when one (a) takes into account the Chief Justice’s performance in the
post-Dickerson cases of Martinez and Patane and (b) keeps in mind that
the person offering this theory is a great admirer of Rehnquist’s (and
also a former law clerk to him), this theory takes on a certain
plausibility:
If there had been four votes to overrule Miranda, it is difficult to
imagine that, given his decades of principled opposition, the
Chief would not have readily provided the fifth. But the votes
were not there.
In their place was genuine peril. . . . [I]f [§ 3501] were
unconstitutional, that would presumably be because Miranda
was not mere prophylaxis, but itself required by the
Constitution.
Had the Chief voted with the dissenters, the majority opinion
would have been assigned by the senior Justice in the majority,
in this case Justice Stevens. And Justice Stevens, of course, had
a very different view of Miranda than did the Chief. . . .
[A holding that Miranda is required by the Constitution]
would have undermined the foundation for most if not all of the
224. Most of the participants in Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession
Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 879–1247 (2001) suggested various reasons why Chief Justice
Rehnquist voted the way he did. (The participants were: Paul Cassell, Yale Kamisar, Susan R.
Klein, Richard A. Leo, Laurie Magid, Stephen J. Schulhofer, David A. Strauss, William J. Stuntz,
George C. Thomas III, Charles D. Weisselberg and Welsh S. White.) See also Craig Bradley,
Behind the Dickerson Decision, 36 TRIAL 80 (Oct. 2000); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman,
Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 61; Daniel M. Katz, Institutional Rules,
Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight in
Dickerson v. United States, 22 J. L. & POL 303 (2006).
225. R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10 (2005).
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previous decisions limiting Miranda, quietly threatening three
decades of the Chief’s careful efforts to cabin in that decision
appropriately. Therefore, in my judgment, the Chief acted
decisively to avoid that consequence. He voted with the majority
and assigned the opinion to himself.
With that backdrop, the majority opinion in Dickerson is, in
many respects, amusing to read. Its holding can be characterized
as threefold: First, Miranda is NOT required by the
Constitution; it is merely prophylactic and its exceptions remain
good law. Second, [§ 3501] is not good law. Third, do not ask
why, and please, never, ever, ever cite this opinion for any
reason.226
Although, as Mr. Cruz suggests, Chief Justice Rehnquist may have
wished that his Dickerson opinion would “never, ever” be cited “for any
reason,” it has been. In Patane, Justice Thomas told us that “[t]he
[Dickerson] Court’s reliance on our Miranda precedents [including
Elstad] further demonstrates the continuing validity of those
decisions.”227 To reaffirm the constitutionality of Miranda without
repudiating cases such as Elstad is not easy. But to read Dickerson as
somehow “relying” on cases such as Elstad and demonstrating their
“continuing validity” is truly extraordinary. Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion.
XII. BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS: THE COURT INFLICTS A
HEAVY BLOW ON MIRANDA
As a general matter, law professors like to be quoted by the U.S.
Supreme Court. But there are exceptional cases. For Professor Fred
Inbau, senior co-author of the Inbau-Reid police interrogation
manual228—considered “the undisputed bible of police interrogation
since its initial publication in 1962”229—the Miranda opinion’s

226. Id. at 14–15. Mr. Cruz takes comfort in the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist never said in
Dickerson that the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution. See id. at 15 n.26. But to say
that would be incorrect. As the Miranda Court told us, and as Rehnquist reminded us in Dickerson
that Miranda told us, “the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from
the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were ‘at least as effective in apprising accused persons
of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.’” Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 440.
227. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2010) (emphasis added).
228. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
229. Robert M. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau, 89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1998, at B9.
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references to and quotations from his work marked such an exception.
In the course of setting forth what he thought was occurring in most
“interrogation rooms” throughout the land (the police prefer to call them
“interview rooms”), Chief Justice Warren turned to various interrogation
manuals. Warren believed (and I agree with him) that these manuals
“professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently
used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By
considering [them], it is possible to describe procedures observed and
noted around the country.”230 Warren referred to or quoted from the
Inbau-Reid manual nine times—but never with approval.231
Miranda not only had an impact on police interrogation and the law
school curriculum.232 It also affected book publishing. The landmark
Miranda case necessitated a new edition of the Inbau-Reid manual as
soon as possible. And a new edition was published only a year after
Miranda was decided. As Charles Weisselberg has noted,233 in their first
post-Miranda edition, Inbau and Reid assured their readers that “all but a
very few of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our
earlier publication are still valid if used after the recently prescribed
warnings have been given to the suspect . . . [and] after he has waived
his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel.”234 It seemed
obvious to Professor Inbau that Miranda required the police to obtain a
waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
subjecting the custodial suspect to the interrogation process.
In the 1960s, few, if any, believed that a day would come when the
U.S. Supreme Court would read Miranda more narrowly and more

230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966).
231. Id. at 449–55. Although one commentator undoubtedly exaggerated, there is something to
what he said about Chief Justice Warren’s use of the Inbau-Reid manual, Albert W. Alschuler,
Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 971 (1997): It “was exhibited in the Miranda
opinion like a relic from a medieval torture chamber.”
Chief Justice Warren may have been unhappy with some of the psychological tactics
recommended by Inbau, but the latter was a strong opponent of anything resembling the “third
degree.” See generally Ronald J. Allen, Tribute to Fred Inbau, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1271
(1999); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogation and
Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986); Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: “The
Importance of Being Guilty,” 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977); Yale Kamisar, What is an
“Involuntary” Confession: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963).
232. Until Miranda was handed down, very few law schools, if any, offered criminal procedure
as a separate course. That changed very quickly.
233. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1528.
234. Id. (quoting FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
1 (2d ed. 1967) (emphasis added by Professor Weisselberg)).
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grudgingly than did Inbau, a proponent of deceit and deception in
obtaining confessions.235 But that day did come—in 2010, when the
Court handed down Berghuis v. Thompkins.236
I once said that Elstad, or at least an expansive reading of this case,
would administer a crippling blow to Miranda.237 I considered Elstad the
worst that could happen to Miranda short of overruling it.238 But that
was before Thompkins was decided. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court discusses the facts of Thompkins at considerable length. A
summary of these facts follows:
Detective Helgert and another police officer questioned defendant
Thompkins about a shooting in which one person died. The interrogation
was conducted in the early afternoon in a small room. Thompkins sat in
a straight-backed chair. At no time during his meeting with the police
did Thompkins express a desire to see a lawyer or say he wanted to
remain silent. Moreover, he never said that he did not want to talk to the
police. But he declined to sign a written acknowledgement that he had
been advised of his rights and understood them. During the
interrogation, which lasted about three hours, Thompkins was largely
silent, but he did give a few “limited verbal responses,” such as “yeah,”
“no,” or “I don’t know.”
At the outset of the interrogation, Detective Helgert presented
Thompkins with a form containing the four standard Miranda warnings
and a fifth warning that read: “You have the right to decide at any time
before or during questioning to use your right to remain silent and your
right to talk with a lawyer while you are being questioned.” At Helgert’s
request, Thompkins read the fifth warning out loud. Helgert himself then
read the four standard Miranda warnings out loud.
About two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, the
detective asked Thompkins a series of questions, beginning with whether
he believed in God. Thompkins’ reply to the first question was that he
did believe in God, his eyes “well[ing] up in tears.” Helgert’s next
question was: “Do you pray to God?” Again, Thompkins answered that
he did. Finally, the detective asked: “Do you pray to God to forgive you
for shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered that he did, looking
away. About fifteen minutes later, after Thompkins had refused to make

235. See Thomas, supra note 229.
236. 560 U.S. __,130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
237. See Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J.
465, 478–80 (1999).
238. See id. at 480.
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a written confession, the interrogation ended.239
The Michigan trial court refused to exclude Thompkins’ statements.
He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. On habeas corpus, the
federal district court denied relief. But a unanimous three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that
the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established law and had
based their decisions on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the
state court’s adjudication of the merits was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.”240
According to the Sixth Circuit, the state court unreasonably
determined the facts because “the evidence demonstrates that
Thompkins was silent for two hours and forty-five minutes.”241
Moreover, the defendant’s “persistent silence for nearly three hours in
response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of the
story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers:
Thompkins did not wish to waive his rights.”242
A.

Must the Police Obtain a Waiver of Rights Before Interrogation
Commences?

A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion of the Court. Although Miranda prevents the police from
interrogating suspects without first providing them with the now-familiar
Miranda warnings, wrote Kennedy, “it does not impose a formalistic
waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those
rights.”243 Where “the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was
given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced
statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”244
The majority emphasized that the primary protection afforded custodial
suspects who are, or are going to be, interrogated, ‘“is the Miranda
warnings themselves.’”245
239. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57.
240. See id. at 2258 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2006)).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 2258–59.
243. Id. at 2262.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2263 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)).
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Thompkins argued that the police could not interrogate him until they
first obtained a waiver of his rights. “The Miranda rule and its
requirements are met,” responded the Court, “if a suspect receives
adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity
to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions.”246 Since
Thompkins received and understood the Miranda warnings, and never
invoked his Miranda rights, he “waive[d] the right to remain silent by
making an uncoerced statement to the police.”247 The police did not
obtain an explicit or specific waiver of Thompkins’ right before
interrogating him.248 According to the Thompkins majority, however, the
police did not have to do so.
During the oral arguments, Justice Breyer expressed surprise at the
government’s contention that the waiver of Miranda rights could take
place after the police had begun interrogating the suspect.249 I had the
same reaction and reread the Miranda opinion, expecting to find strong,
explicit language prohibiting such a course of action. Instead I
discovered that the language in Miranda was not nearly as explicit as I
thought it was. At one point, Miranda does come very close to saying
what I was looking for: “After such warnings have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a
statement.”250 But the Court does not unequivocally say that the only
time the police must obtain a waiver of Miranda rights is immediately
after the warnings have been given and before any interrogation has
commenced. And the sentence immediately before the sentence quoted
above reads: “Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to
[the suspect] throughout the interrogation.”251
At another point, Miranda also comes close to saying what I hoped to
find: “The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not
simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.”252 But
the very next sentence veers off: “The warnings required and the waiver
necessary in accordance with our opinion today are . . . prerequisites to

246. Id.
247. Id. at 2264.
248. See id.
249. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 107, at 650.
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 476.
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the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.253 Of course a
waiver of rights must take place before any statement is ultimately
admissible, but must the waiver occur before any interrogation has
begun or may it take place later?
At still another point, Miranda tells us: “The principles announced
today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police
interrogation while in custody . . . .”254 But what did the Court mean by
“the principles announced today?” Did it mean all the principles—
including when and how waivers have to take place? Or did the Court
mean only the principles pertaining to how and when the warnings must
be given and how and when custodial suspects may assert their rights?
When Miranda was decided, the member of the Court who most
clearly recognized that the landmark decision required a suspect to
waive his or her rights before interrogation commenced (although he
was not happy about it) seems to have been dissenting Justice White.
The very first sentence of White’s twenty-page dissenting opinion reads:
“The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids incustody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority
opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support
in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth
Amendment.”255 Moreover, ten pages later, Justice White observes that
“apparently, it is only if the accused is also warned of his right to
counsel and waives both that right and the right against selfincrimination that the inherent compulsiveness of interrogation
disappears.”256
Although I believe Justice White’s understanding of what Miranda
requires the police to do is noteworthy, I realize, too, that sometimes a
dissenting or concurring Justice may distort or exaggerate the majority’s
ruling. Therefore, even taking into account Justice White’s dissent, one
may plausibly conclude that the explicit language of the Court is not
conclusive on the point in time when the waiver of rights must occur.

253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 477.
255. Id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.) (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 536 (emphasis added); see also id. at 537 (“[T]he Court declares that the accused may
not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the right to counsel . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
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The Implications of Miranda’s Concern About the “Compelling
Atmosphere” of Police Interrogation

However, there is another way to establish that the Thompkins Court
went astray when it ruled that the police could begin interrogating
custodial suspects before they waived their rights and then utilize the
interrogation process itself in order to obtain the necessary waiver. This
other route is based on the implications of the Miranda opinion’s
pervasive concern and anxiety about what is variously called “the
compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation,”257 “the secret
interrogation process,”258 “the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station,”259 and the “incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.”260
Miranda also tells us that in each of the four cases before the Court
the “interrogation environment” was “created for no purpose other than
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere
carries its own badge of intimidation.”261 At another point, Miranda
observes: “An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the
techniques of persuasion described [in the police manuals] cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”262 At still another point, the
Miranda Court recalls that in Escobedo v. Illinois,263 “[t]he entire thrust
of police interrogation there, as in all [four of the cases before the Court]
today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair
his capacity for rational judgment.”264
One of the basic premises of Miranda was that “the process of
custodial interrogation contains inherent pressures that compel suspects
to speak.”265 Charles Weisselberg, who has studied the issue extensively,
tells us that the principal ingredients of custodial interrogation have
changed very little since Miranda: “the basic psychological approach to
interrogation described in the Miranda decision remains prevalent in the

257. Id. at 465.
258. Id. at 470.
259. Id. at 461.
260. Id. at 445.
261. Id. at 457.
262. Id. at 461.
263. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
264. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
265. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1522.
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United States”266 and “many of the same tactics discussed by the justices
in 1966” are “widely used” today.267
It is hard to believe that the Miranda Court, a Court which was so
troubled by in-custodial police interrogation, would (a) require the
police to warn custodial suspects of their rights, yet (b) permit the police
to intimidate, mislead, deceive, bluff, coax, or trick these same suspects
into “waiving” their rights by subjecting them to interrogation. This is
why I agree with Professor Weisselberg (he actually made this point two
years before Thompkins was decided), who explained why the Miranda
Court must have meant that a waiver of rights had to take place before
interrogation commences: “Given the [Miranda] Court’s extensive and
critical discussion of the interrogation manuals, this could only mean
that waivers could not be obtained while interrogators were applying the
tactics advocated in the manuals.”268
Quoting with approval from Davis v. United States, the Thompkins
Court does say that “the primary protection afforded suspects subject[ed]
to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.”269 But
why is this so? As the late Welsh White pointed out a decade ago,
“[t]ranscripts of modern interrogations indicate that police interrogators
are often so overwhelmingly in control of the interrogation—dictating
the pace of the questioning and the topics under discussion—that the
suspect has no practical opportunity to invoke his rights during the most
critical parts of the interrogation.”270
C.

What Likely Takes Place in the Interrogation Room?

In the course of rejecting Mr. Thompkins’ argument that the police
could not question him “until they obtained a waiver first,” the
Thompkins Court had some nice things to say about interrogation:
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information
that can put his or her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into
perspective. As questioning commences and then continues, the
266. Id. at 1529.
267. Id. at 1537.
268. Id. at 1528.
269. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) (quoting Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)).
270. White, supra note 2, at 1215. Professor White further cites “examples of questioning that is
so rapid that the suspect has no practical opportunity to halt the questioning in order to invoke his
rights.” Id. at 1215 n.24 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. &
SOC’Y 189, 227–30 (1997)).
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suspect has the opportunity to consider the choices he or she
faces and to make a more informed decision, either to insist on
silence or to cooperate. When the suspect knows that Miranda
rights can be invoked at any time, he or she has the opportunity
to reassess his or her immediate and longterm interests.
Cooperation with the police may result in more favorable
treatment for the suspect; the apprehension of accomplices; the
prevention of continuing injury and fear; beginning steps
towards relief or solace for the victims; and the beginning of the
suspect’s own return to the law and the social order it seeks to
protect.271
This, I submit, is a highly sanitized description of the interrogation
process. One almost gets the feeling that the suspect is having a
straightforward talk with his own lawyer about the strengths and
weaknesses of his case. But the people who are providing the suspect
with what the Court calls “the opportunity to consider the choices he or
she faces and to make a more informed decision” are not the suspect’s
friends or advisors (although they often pretend to be), but his
antagonists. Their job is not to help the suspect “make a more informed
decision” (although they often pretend it is), but to figure out how best to
bury him—or, to put it more precisely, how best to get him to “dig his
own grave.”
David Simon knows something about interrogation. He took a leave
of absence from his newspaper to study how police interrogation was
conducted by the Baltimore Police Department. He had unlimited access
to the city’s homicide detectives for one year. His book, Homicide: A
Year on the Killing Streets, was the result.272 According to Mr. Simon:
With rare exception, a confession is compelled, provoked and
manipulated from a suspect by a detective who has been trained
in a generally deceitful art. That is the essence of interrogation,
and those who believe that a straightforward conversation
between a cop and a criminal—devoid of any treachery—is
going to solve a crime are somewhat beyond naive.273
Mr. Simon is convinced that police interrogation is necessary.
“Without a chance for a detective to manipulate a suspect’s mind,” he

271. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
272. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991). In an author’s note,
Mr. Simon tells us that his book is a “work of journalism” and that the events he has written about
“occurred in the manner described.” Id. at 627.
273. Id. at 211.

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

THE RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL (?) OF MIRANDA

1017

notes, “a lot of bad people would simply go free.”274 But he is
uncomfortable about it, because, as he sees it, the interrogation process
is basically fraudulent:
[A homicide detective] becomes a salesman, a huckster as
thieving and silver-tongued as any man who ever moved used
cars or aluminum siding—more so, in fact, when you consider
that he’s selling long prison terms to customers who have no
genuine need for the product.
. . . The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect’s interest to
talk with police will forever be the catalyst in any criminal
interrogation.275
Richard Leo has a very different background than David Simon. Leo
is both a lawyer and a criminologist. He has witnessed 120 live
interrogations and studied over 1500 electronically recorded ones. He
has also interviewed more than 100 police interrogators.276 When
discussing the interrogation process, Professor Leo also uses the “fraud”
word:
Police interrogation in the American adversary system is firmly
rooted in fraud. Modern interrogation is fraudulent not simply
because police are legally permitted to—and frequently do—lie
to suspects about such things as the seriousness of the crime or
case evidence (e.g., fingerprints, eyewitnesses or DNA results)
that they do not possess. It is also based on fraud because
detectives seek to create the illusion that they share a common
interest with the suspect and that he can escape or mitigate
punishment only by cooperating with them and providing a full
confession. Although the suspect’s self-interest would usually
best be served by remaining completely silent, interrogators seek
at every step to convince him that what is in their professional
self-interest is somehow in his personal self-interest. The entire
interrogation process is carefully staged to hide the fact that
police interrogators are the suspect’s adversary.277
274. Id. at 212.
275. Id. at 213.
276. E-mail from Richard A. Leo, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F., to author (Feb. 4,
2012) (on file with author).
277. LEO, supra note 2, at 25; see also id. at 34, 325–26.
Consider, too, Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey
of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383–84 (2007) (“The stated objective
of interrogation is to move a presumed guilty suspect from denial to admission. The techniques used
are thus designed to overcome a suspect’s resistance and to induce him or her to
confess. . . . [Professors] Ofshe and Leo (1997) have suggested that interrogation can best be
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“Waiver by Confession”

Thompkins disregarded Miranda in other respects. At one point,
Miranda warned that “a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that [custodial suspects] knowingly and intelligently
waived” their rights278—a “burden rightly on its shoulders” because “the
State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under
which the interrogation takes place.”279 But now that Thompkins is on
the books, the state’s burden has lightened greatly.
To be sure, in order to establish a valid waiver of rights, the
prosecution must not only show that the Miranda warnings were
followed by an uncoerced incriminating statement. It must also establish
that the suspect understood his or her Miranda rights.280 As the
Thompkins case itself illustrates, however, this will rarely cause the
prosecution any difficulty.
If the suspect was afforded the opportunity to read a written copy of
the Miranda warnings, the prosecution need only show that the suspect
could read and understand English.281 If the police read the warnings
aloud, the prosecution need only show that the suspect heard them and
understood English.282
Miranda also told us that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply
from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”283 But this
caution no longer appears to be operative.
The Thompkins majority tells us so about as clearly as one can: “In
sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings,
and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent
by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”284
understood as a two-step psychological process in which the interrogator first seeks to convince the
suspect that he or she is trapped and then attempts to induce the suspect to perceive that the benefits
of confessing outweigh the costs.”).
278. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
279. Id.
280. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010).
281. See id. at 2262.
282. See id. at 2261–62.
283. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
284. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. Earlier in its opinion, the majority had said virtually the same
thing. See id. at 2262, 2263. The majority also observed more generally:
As a general proposition, the law can presume than an individual who, with a full
understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise and has
made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford. . . .
. . . Thompkins’ answer to Helgert’s question about praying to God for forgiveness . . . was
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An amicus brief filed on behalf of Mr. Thompkins anticipated how
the Court might decide the case and called it “waiver by confession.”285
Such a description of the Thompkins ruling will undoubtedly strike some
as quite harsh, but isn’t it basically right? As the amicus brief observes:
“If a suspect’s eventual inculpatory statement suffices to show waiver,
then there will always be a waiver; no Miranda case would ever be
litigated in the absence of an inculpatory statement.”286
Some may view Thompkins as simply another instance of chipping
away at Miranda. I would put it more strongly. I would go so far as to
say that Thompkins is a case where the Court fired point-blank at
Miranda. Thompkins requires a suspect to prove that he invoked his
right to remain silent instead of requiring the prosecution to prove that
the suspect waived that right. As two of the nation’s leading
commentators on the subject recently observed: “[In] removing the last
residue of the ‘heavy burden’ waiver language from Miranda doctrine,
Thompkins is perhaps the most significant Miranda case yet decided.”287
At one point, the Thompkins majority relied on North Carolina v.
Butler:288 “Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be
implied through ‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding
of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.’”289 But Butler
was a case about the specificity of an effective waiver, not when the
waiver must take place. The most plausible reading of the Butler record
is that the event which might have constituted an effective waiver—the
suspect’s statement “I will talk to you but I am not signing any
form”290—took place immediately after he had been advised of his
rights.
Although Butler is often called an “implied waiver” case, there is
nothing implicit about the statement “I will talk to you but . . . .”291 It
sufficient to show a course of conduct indicating waiver.
Id. at 2262–63.
285. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the ACLU
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470).
286. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). This is a slight exaggeration. In a few instances the
inculpatory statement might be deemed coerced. But then we would no longer be dealing with a
simple Miranda violation.
287. GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO
MIRANDA AND BEYOND 192 (2012).
288. 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (per Stewart, J.).
289. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
290. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 370, 371.
291. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2266, 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
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might be more accurate to call Butler a dispute about whether a valid
waiver could be “qualified” or “conditional” or must be “formal” or
“formalistic.”292
The Thompkins majority also relied on Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion in Connecticut v. Barrett.293 According to the Thompkins
majority, Justice Brennan recognized in his Barrett concurrence that
earlier (in Butler) the Court had “‘retreated’ from the ‘language and
tenor of the Miranda opinion,’ which ‘suggested that the Court would
require that a waiver . . . be ‘specifically made.’”294 As the quotation
itself indicates, however, Brennan never suggested that the Court had
retreated on another front—the issue presented in Thompkins—the point
in time when a waiver of rights has to take place.
The Thompkins Court also relied on Davis v. United States.295 Davis
had ruled that a suspect invoking the Miranda right to counsel must do
so “unambiguously.”296 The Thompkins Court could see “no principled
reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has
invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to
counsel.”297
First of all, Davis involved a suspect who had already waived his
right to remain silent, but changed his mind some ninety minutes later—
when the interrogation was well underway.298 The Davis majority
seemed to consider this factor quite important: “We . . . hold that, after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement
officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly
requests an attorney.”299
Moreover, Justice Souter, who wrote a concurring opinion in Davis,

292. One of Butler’s arguments was that in order for a waiver of rights to be effective, a custodial
suspect had to say specifically that he was waiving his right to the presence of counsel or the right to
remain silent. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 370–71. After all, Miranda does say that “[an] express
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)
(emphasis added).
293. 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
294. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (referring to Barrett, 479 U.S. at 531–32).
295. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
296. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2253–60 (discussing Davis, 512 U.S. at 455).
297. Id. at 2253–54.
298. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455.
299. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). As Justice Sotomayor noted in her Thompkins dissent, “Davis’
holding is explicitly predicated on [the] fact” that the suspect’s equivocal references to a lawyer
“occurred only after he had given express oral and written waivers of his rights.” Thompkins, 130 S.
Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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expressed concern that the majority might have assigned too much
weight to the fact that the suspect had initially waived his right to
counsel:
Nor may the standard governing waivers as expressed in these
statements be deflected away by drawing a distinction between
initial waivers of Miranda rights and subsequent decisions to
reinvoke them, on the theory that so long as the burden to
demonstrate waiver rests on the government, it is only fair to
make the suspect shoulder a burden of showing a clear
subsequent assertion. Miranda itself discredited the legitimacy
of any such distinction.300
In the second place, there does seem to be a “principled reason” for
using different standards for determining whether a suspect has asserted
his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. As Justice Sotomayor
expressed it in her Thompkins dissent:
Advising a suspect that he has a “right to remain silent” is
unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do in some
particular fashion) to ensure the right will be protected. . . . By
contrast, telling a suspect “he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires” . . .
implies the need for speech to exercise that right . . . .
. . . [The] Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should
use [certain] magic words [to invoke his right to remain silent],
and there is little reason to believe police—who have ample
incentives to avoid invocation—will provide such guidance.301
XIII. ALTERNATIVES TO MIRANDA
As the Thompkins case illustrates, Miranda has been downsized and
weakened in various ways. Oral statements obtained from custodial
suspects who were never advised of their rights may be used to impeach
them if they have the audacity to take the stand in their own defense. In
addition, physical evidence derived from un-Mirandized statements may
be used against defendants. So may prosecution witnesses whose
identities or whereabouts would not have been known except for the
defendants’ un-Mirandized statements. The fact that these exceptions to
Miranda furnish law enforcement officials a strong incentive to
300. Davis, 512 U.S. at 470–71 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ.).
301. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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disregard Miranda does not matter.
Moreover, although the Miranda Court was quite upset by the tactics
recommended in the interrogation manuals, the present Court permits the
police to interrogate custodial suspects before they waive their rights. As
a result, the police may overwhelm, confuse, or trick custodial suspects
into “waiving” their rights by interrogating them before they waive their
rights.
Has the time come to give up on Miranda and start over? Has the time
come to accept the fact that Miranda does not—and never did—go far
enough? Has the time come to recognize that Miranda—even the
“original,” undiminished version—was fundamentally flawed?
A.

Should We Provide Custodial Suspects More Protection than
Miranda Does (or Ever Did)?

Based on his experience as a public defender before entering
academia, and discussions with many of his indigent clients, Charles
Ogletree has underscored the need for a non-waivable right to the advice
of counsel: “I would propose the adoption, either judicially or
legislative, of a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from
interrogating a suspect in custody who has not consulted with an
attorney.”302
The husband-wife team of Irene and Yale Rosenberg has made a
proposal that goes still further. They maintain that statements made by
custodial suspects to law enforcement officials should be inadmissible:
(a) whether or not made in response to police questioning, (b) whether or
not the suspects had earlier been advised of their rights by the police;
and (c) evidently, whether or not they had earlier obtained the advice of
counsel.303
The Rosenbergs maintain that “suspects who are in custody cannot
make truly voluntary or noncompelled confessions.”304 Although they
recognize that “Miranda focused on the inherent coerciveness of
custodial interrogation,”305 the Rosenbergs believe that “it is custody in
and of itself that is coercive.”306

302. Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987).
303. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 75 (1989).
304. Id. at 109.
305. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original).
306. Id.
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Otis Stephens, Jr., has suggested still another possible solution to the
police interrogation problem: “Probably nothing short of a blanket
requirement that no suspect be questioned except in the presence of his
attorney could be expected to remove the elements of psychological
coercion to which the Court has so long objected.”307
Although some of these proposals or suggestions go further than
others, I believe they have one thing in common: No Supreme Court or
Congress or state legislature would seriously consider any of them.
The Warren Court was undoubtedly more concerned about protecting
the rights of custodial suspects than any other Supreme Court in
American history. As one commentator aptly put it, “[t]he history of the
Warren Court may be taken as a case study of a court that for a season
determined to employ its judicial resources in an effort to alter
significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the interest of a
larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the law.”308
Nevertheless, this Court appears to have been so closely divided over
the rights of custodial suspects that it was barely able to go as far as it
did. According to one Justice who attended the March 1966 meeting on
Miranda, if FBI agents had not been informing suspects of their rights
for a number of years (although not as extensively as Miranda required),
Chief Justice Warren’s views might not have been supported by a
majority of the Court.309
It is worth recalling that, twenty years after Miranda was handed
down, Justice O’Connor, speaking for a majority of the Court, reminded
us that Miranda “[d]ecline[d] to adopt the more extreme position [one
advocated at the time by the ACLU] that the actual presence of a lawyer
was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogation.”310 The Miranda Court decided instead that “the suspect’s
Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive
means.”311
Looking back at Miranda, Justice O’Connor emphasized that the
opinion was not based on the premise that “the rights and needs of the

307. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205 (1973).
308. Allen, supra note 43, at 525.
309. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 589
(1983). Professor Schwartz does not identify the Justice. However, he does quote Justice Fortas, a
member of the 5-4 majority in Miranda, to the effect that the Miranda decision was “entirely”
Warren’s. See id.
310. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986); see also supra note 25.
311. Id.
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defendant are paramount to all others.”312 Rather, it “embodies a
carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant’s
and society’s interests.”313 As I noted at the time, this is the way
“Miranda’s defenders—not its critics—have talked about the case for
the past twenty years.”314
B.

Should We Give Up on Miranda and Reinvigorate the Old Due
Process/“Totality of the Circumstances”/“Voluntariness” Test?

As he points out, Charles Weisselberg has “long been an advocate of
the Miranda decision and its theoretically bright-line rules.”315 But he no
longer is. In an important article, Professor Weisselberg has spelled out
the various ways the Supreme Courts that have succeeded the Warren
Court have “effectively encouraged police practices that have gutted
Miranda’s safeguards, to the extent those safeguards ever truly
existed.”316 He concludes that the time has come to give Miranda a
respectful burial “and move on.”317
I agree with much of what Professor Weisselberg has to say about
Miranda. For example, I share his concern (as any reader of this Article
who has come this far with me would know) that we no longer have “a
clean separation between administration of Miranda warnings and the
use of interrogation tactics, at least not in the way the Miranda Court
envisioned.”318 (Weisselberg wrote this two years before the Thompkins
case was decided!)319
I also agree with Professor Weisselberg when he points out:
Observational studies and my review of training materials
provide significant evidence that the warnings and waiver
regime has moved at least partway into the interrogation
process, contrary to the “time out” from the pressures of
interrogation the Court imagined. Officers may use pre-Miranda
conversation to build rapport, which is important to obtaining a
Miranda waiver and—eventually—a statement. Officers may

312. Id. at 433 n.4.
313. See id. (emphasis in original).
314. Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases
of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
315. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1524.
316. Id. at 1521.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1562.
319. See the discussion of Berghuis v. Thompkins in supra notes 236–301.
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also downplay the significance of the warning or portray it as a
bureaucratic step to be satisfied before a conversation may
occur. There is also evidence that police often describe some of
the evidence against suspects before seeking waivers . . . .
. . . If more police seek “agreements [from suspects] to listen” or
give warnings only after making a confrontation statement, then
we may truly say that Miranda’s safeguards have been relocated
to the heart of the psychological process of interrogation.320
Professor Weisselberg also tells us that “the best evidence is now that
a significant percentage of suspects cannot comprehend the warnings or
the rights they are intended to convey.”321 To make matters worse, the
Supreme Court has permitted the police officers who are required to give
the Miranda warnings a good deal of leeway in doing so.322
It would be hard to deny that the current state of the law governing
the admissibility of confessions leaves much to be desired. But is
Weisselberg’s response the correct one? He would give up on Miranda
and “move on.”323 Move on to what? To the old due process/“totality of
the circumstances”/“voluntariness” test—a standard that he hopes will
be reinvigorated and provide a more formidable protection for custodial
suspects than Miranda does.324
First of all, before we return to full-fledged reliance on the
“voluntariness” test, what institution will abolish Miranda? I am
painfully aware that some Supreme Court Justices do not take Dickerson
v. United States seriously.325 Nevertheless, in Dickerson, a 7-2 majority
did inform us that “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this
Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”326 Under
these circumstances, I think it fair to say that there would be little or no
support for another federal statute “overruling” Miranda. If Miranda is
to be given a decent burial, the Supreme Court itself will have to conduct
the ceremony.
320. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1562–63.
321. Id. at 1563. According to the most significant study of Miranda warnings and mental
disability, Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 540–41 (2002), mentally disabled subjects
“understood only about 20% of the critical words comprising the Miranda vocabulary.”
Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1570.
322. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1564 (discussing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195
(1989)).
323. See supra note 317.
324. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597–99.
325. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
326. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
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So far as I can tell, the Court might overrule Miranda for any one or
combination of three reasons: (1) a majority might believe that even a
seriously weakened Miranda was still making life too difficult for law
enforcement officials; (2) a majority might be sufficiently unconcerned
about the rights of custodial suspects to pay even lip service to the
privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel when a person
is in the stationhouse; or (3) a majority of the Court might be willing,
perhaps even eager, to give the trial courts a larger role in administering
the law of confessions. As for reason (3), this is probably why the 1968
statute that purported to abolish Miranda would have applied only one
standard—the “voluntariness” test. As Steve Schulhofer has observed,
this test “virtually invited [trial judges] to give weight to their subjective
preferences” and “discouraged active review even by the most
conscientious appellate judges.”327
It is hard to see why a Court that was sufficiently disenchanted with
Miranda to overrule it would want to reshape the old “voluntariness”
test so that it furnished custodial suspects more protection than did the
Miranda regime. Why, for example, would the Court that overruled
Miranda want to use the “voluntariness” test to establish a cleaner
separation between the giving of the warnings and the employment of
interrogation tactics?
Would there be any “warnings of rights” requirement at all under the
new voluntariness regime? Would a Court that overruled Miranda be
likely to require the police to advise custodial suspects of their rights all
over again? If so, what reason do we have to expect that the percentage
of suspects who comprehend the warnings would increase?
As long as law enforcement officials administer the warnings, how
can we expect them to advise suspects of their rights more clearly and
more emphatically than they do now? If, in a world without Miranda,
law enforcement officials are no longer required to give the warnings,
suspects may still remember their rights from old TV shows. But
eventually wouldn’t the percentage of suspects who know their rights
decrease sharply?
I did say recently that even if neither the Fifth Amendment privilege
nor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel were deemed applicable to the
states, the Supreme Court could still have provided custodial suspects
more protection by turning to the old “voluntariness” test and reinforcing
it.328 But I was discussing a very different Supreme Court than the one

327. Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 869–70.
328. See Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really Matter Whether Courts Work Within the
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we have today. I was talking about the Warren Court, a Court “greatly
concerned about the many inadequacies of the prevailing test for the
admissibility of confessions . . . and determined to do something about
it.”329 But why would the current Court, one that has permitted Miranda
to be weakened in various ways, want to fortify the voluntariness test so
custodial suspects would receive greater protection?
Apparently, Professor Weisselberg believes that state legislatures
might do what the Supreme Court, and courts generally, have failed to
do in recent years—provide custodial suspects with greater protection.
“[M]ost importantly,” he tells us, state legislatures “might require
videotaping, a movement that is gaining strength among the states.”330
After a slow start, post-Miranda electronic recording of police
interrogations has indeed gained strength among the states.331 But this
movement is occurring while Miranda is still on the books. Noteworthy,
too, is the fact that the first two states to require their law enforcement
officers to tape custodial police interrogations, Alaska (1985) and
Minnesota (1994), both did so by state court decision, not state
legislation.332
Moreover, a specific state may choose to record custodial
interrogation for a reason peculiar to that state. For example, it appears
that “the push” for tape recording in Illinois “arose from a spate of false
confession cases and questionable interrogations that have plagued
Illinois law enforcement and undermined the general public’s faith in the
criminal justice system.”333
“Clearly Marked” Provisions of the Bill of Rights or With the “Generalities” of the Fourteenth
Amendment?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 513, 522–27 (2009). After all, the Warren Court told
us that the fact that “a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right
respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation . . . is a significant factor in considering the
voluntariness of statements later made.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740–41 (1966)
(emphasis added) (applying the “voluntariness” test on habeas corpus).
329. Kamisar, supra note 328, at 525 n.59.
330. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597.
331. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 248 (2011) (finding that “[at] least 500
police departments now videotape interrogations. Police in these departments have reported positive
experiences with videotaping and say that recording does not discourage a suspect’s cooperation”).
332. Alaska required tape recording as a matter of due process under its state constitution. See
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). Minnesota followed when the state supreme court
exercised its supervisory powers over state criminal justice. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587
(Minn. 1994). Today, however, most of the nineteen jurisdictions that “require or encourage
electronic recording of at least some interrogations” do so by statute. See GARRETT, supra note 331,
at 248.
333. Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of
Interrogations is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J.
337, 339 (2001).
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The need for video and audiotaping would undoubtedly be great if the
admissibility of confessions turned on the spongy, unruly
“voluntariness” test.334 But electronic recording is also quite important
under a Miranda regime. After all, “absent a recording, there is simply
no way to adequately determine whether the police complied with the
Miranda requirements [for example, gave the fourfold warnings at the
appropriate time] or whether the suspect provided a knowing and
voluntary waiver.”335
It is not at all clear whether the demise of Miranda would lead to an
acceleration of electronic recording of police interrogation. “[M]ost
police departments still do not record interrogations, and many of those

334. Paul Cassell has forcefully argued that custodial suspects should be deprived of certain
Miranda rights in return for a requirement that all police interrogators be videotaped. See Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 486–96
(1996). Under Cassell’s proposal, a suspect would be warned of his right to a lawyer, but only when
brought before a judge. Moreover, police questioning could proceed whether or not the police
obtained an affirmative waiver of the right to remain silent. Finally, the police would no longer be
required to stop questioning suspects who tried to end the interrogation or sought a lawyer’s help.
Professor Cassell asks: “[I]f you were facing a police officer with a rubber hose, would you prefer a
world in which he was required to mumble the Miranda warnings and have you waive your rights,
all as reported by him in later testimony? Or a world in which the interrogation is videorecorded and
the burden is on law enforcement to explain if it is not . . . ?” Id. at 487. There is much to be said for
videotaping police interrogations. Nevertheless, I am not happy with Cassell’s proposal. One reason
is that I was quite disappointed by Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), one of the
relatively few reported cases where the police interrogation was recorded.
In Miller, a 2-1 majority concluded that the confession made by the defendant (the prime suspect
in a brutal murder case) was “voluntarily given.” Id. at 600. (Because the suspect had waived his
Miranda rights, the court fell back on the “voluntariness” test.) However, the police interrogator
repeatedly assured the suspect that he was not a criminal who should be punished, but only a
mentally ill person who was not responsible for the murder or for anything else he might have done.
Id. at 602. Moreover, although the 2-1 majority purported to consider the “totality of the
circumstances,” it did not seem to take into account that at the end of the interrogation (an
admittedly brief one), the defendant collapsed into a catatonic state and was rushed to a hospital. Id.
at 604.
When it comes to the permissible use of police trickery and deception (which is frequently the
issue when suspects waive their Miranda rights, as they often do), judges are likely to be far apart—
as they were in Miller v. Fenton. Therefore, I am inclined to agree with Steve Schulhofer. He
recognizes (as I do) that videotaping is an extremely valuable tool (for both the police interrogator
and the custodial suspect), but maintains that “without clear substantive requirements against which
to test the police behavior that the videotape will reveal, the objective record will lack any specific
legal implications.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 556 (1996).
Moreover, it is unclear whether Professor Cassell’s proposal satisfies the need for a procedure that
is as “effective” as the Miranda system “in securing Fifth Amendment rights.” See Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.6 (2000).
335. LEO, supra note 2, at 300. For the view that there are three constitutional grounds for
requiring police interrogations to be taped, see Slobogin, supra note 2.
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who do tape selectively or only tape the admission.”336 Moreover, the
FBI, “regarded by some as an exemplar of police professionalism, still
refuses to record interrogations as a matter of policy.”337 Proponents of
audio and videotaping are unlikely to best the FBI in state legislatures.
Professor Weisselberg’s optimism about what might happen in a
world without Miranda is not limited to visualizing a sharp increase in
the electronic recording of police interrogation. He also tells us:
One possible outcome [of the overruling of Miranda] might be
legislation that directly regulates the police and affords greater
protection to suspects than Miranda currently provides. A
legislature might, for example, require warnings in very simple
language and instruct police to give them prior to any suspect
interviews or interrogations. It might prohibit some forms of
deception by officers during interrogation.338
What is the basis for such optimism? In the last 100 years, how often
has Congress or the state legislatures demonstrated concern about the
rights of custodial suspects facing police interrogation?
Justice Robert Jackson once observed: “In Great Britain, to observe
civil liberties is good politics and to transgress the rights of the
individual or the minority is bad politics. In the United States I cannot
say this is so.”339 Although Jackson made this comment more than fifty
years ago, I still think it rings true.
The Wickersham Commission Report—detailing the widespread use
of the “third degree” by law enforcement officers—was published in
1931.340 The “third degree” was “an affront to human dignity and a
source of unreliable confessions.”341 Nevertheless, so far as I can tell, for
the next thirty years neither Congress nor any state legislature even came
close to passing any laws pertaining to police lawlessness in obtaining

336. LEO, supra note 2, at 296; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some
Wounded Hopes: The Policy and Politics of a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial
Interrogations, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 401 (2012).
337. LEO, supra note 2, at 296.
338. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597.
339. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
82 (1955). Justice Jackson added: “[Any] court which undertakes [to] enforce civil liberties needs
the support of an enlightened and vigorous public opinion which will be intelligent and
discriminating as to what cases really are civil liberties cases and what questions really are involved
in these cases. I do not think the American public is enlightened on this subject.” Id.
340. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter Wickersham Report]; see generally LEO, supra note 2, at
41–77.
341. Friendly, supra note 195, at 710.

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1030

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

[Vol. 87:965

confessions. (By the 1960s, of course, the Warren Court’s so-called
revolution in American criminal procedure was underway.)
At the time of the Wickersham Report (and for many years
thereafter), federal law enforcement officers and most of their state
counterparts were required to bring suspects promptly or “without
unnecessary delay” to magistrates or commissioners so that they could
be advised of their rights. Moreover, the judicial officers could decide
whether there was good cause to hold the suspects for trial.
Unfortunately, the prompt commitment requirements were not enforced;
they continued to be “empty of force or consequence.”342
However, Professor Zechariah Chafee, who had worked for the
Wickersham Commission, made a relatively modest proposal: exclude
any confession obtained by the police at a time when they were holding
the suspect in violation of the prompt commitment requirement.343 Once
again, as far as I can tell, neither Congress nor any state legislature
seemed interested.
But the Supreme Court was. A decade after Chafee had made his
proposal, the Court in effect adopted it—in the famous case of McNabb
v. United States.344 The McNabb case was heavily criticized by members
of Congress.345 “Congress just reacted with a proposal—the Hobbs
Bill—which was designed to overturn McNabb and which passed the
House three times, but repeatedly died in committee in the Senate.”346
Although McNabb was reaffirmed in Upshaw v. United States
(1948)347 and again in Mallory v. United States (1957),348 criticism of the
rule, which came to be known as the McNabb-Mallory rule, did not let
up. As the authors of the most comprehensive discussion of the rule
describe the reaction to Mallory:
The Mallory decision was greeted by law enforcement officials
342. James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1958).
343. Zechariah Chafee, Remedies for the Third Degree, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1931, at 621,
630.
344. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb case did not rest on any specific provision of the
Constitution. Instead, it was an exercise of the Court’s supervisory power over the administration of
federal criminal justice. Justice Frankfurter and Chafee had once been colleagues on the Harvard
Law faculty. Although Chafee’s article was not cited in McNabb, it is hard to believe that Justice
Frankfurter did not read Chafee’s article before ascending to the Supreme Court.
345. See generally Hogan & Snee, supra note 342.
346. Note, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A Proposed
Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1008 (1959).
347. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
348. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

THE RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL (?) OF MIRANDA

1031

of the District of Columbia (where its impact was greatest) with
something bordering on panic. The Chief of the Metropolitan
Police Department declared (hyperbolically, it is hoped) that the
decision renders the Police Department “almost totally
ineffective.” There were loud demands for a legislative reexamination of the law of arrest, and in the Congress bills were
introduced either to expand the period of allowable detention or
to abolish the McNabb rule itself.349
When one studies Congress’s reaction to the McNabb-Mallory line of
cases, there is little reason to expect that body to fill the gap caused by
the continued weakening (or overruling) of Miranda. Nor does the
reaction of the states to the McNabb-Mallory rule provide much reason
for hope either.
Although McNabb was decided in 1943, not a single state followed
the Supreme Court’s lead until the 1960s. Then, in the next twenty years,
seven states did adopt some version of the McNabb-Mallory rule.350 But
what I consider more significant than the number of states (and there
were not many) is that all but one (Connecticut) did so by state court
decision.351
No survey of the politics of crime in America, however brief, would
be adequate without mentioning Congress’s lopsided votes in support of
the 1968 bill to “overrule” Miranda and reinstate the “voluntariness”
test. As a strong critic of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases
has recognized:
[T]he situation with which the Court was confronted was
sufficiently disturbing that those of us who fear that the Court’s
answer will unduly hamper police interrogation ought to search
hard for alternatives rather than take the easy course of returning
simply to the rule that statements to the police are admissible
unless ‘involuntary.’352

349. Hogan & Snee, supra note 342, at 17. A provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the 1968 law that
purported to “overrule” Miranda, Part (c), was aimed at the McNabb-Mallory rule. It states, in part
that a confession by a person under arrest or detention “shall not be inadmissible solely because of
delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge . . . if such confession was made [within]
six hours immediately following [the person’s] arrest or other detention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)
(2006). Moreover, the six-hour time limitation does not apply where the delay is found to be
“reasonable” considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled. Id. See
generally Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009).
350. See generally Jerald P. Keene, The Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory
Rule, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204 (1981).
351. The Connecticut statute is discussed in State v. Vollhardt, 244 A.2d 601, 607 (Conn. 1968).
352. Friendly, supra note 195, at 711–12.
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Unfortunately, that is essentially what the Congress did.
The “anti-Miranda” bill passed the Senate 72 to 4.353 The House vote
was equally overwhelming. The House voted 317 to 60 against a
conference and then 369 to 17 in favor of accepting the Senate
version.354
I trust I have said enough to explain why I share Don Dripps’s view
that, as a general proposition, “so long as the vast bulk of police and
prosecutorial power targets the relatively powerless (and when will that
ever be otherwise?), criminal procedure rules that limit public power
will come from the courts or they will come from nowhere.”355
C.

Is the Best Solution Interrogation by, or in the Presence of, a
Magistrate or Other Judicial Officer?

In 1932—a long time ago considering the developments in criminal
procedure that have occurred since then356—Professor Paul Kauper
proposed that traditional police interrogation be replaced by judicial or
judicially-supervised questioning.357 In the wake of Miranda, two
eminent judges, first Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer and
then Judge Henry Friendly, returned to the Kauper proposal and built
upon it.358 Thus, Kauper’s proposal became known as the “KauperSchaefer-Friendly” model.359
Although Schaefer and Friendly revised some aspects of the 1932

353. See Kamisar, supra note 39, at 893.
354. See id. at 894. One reason the House may have moved so quickly is that the very day it
began consideration of the bill, Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. See id. at 893. A
number of House members cited this event as a reason for prompt action. Id. at 893–94. However,
the day after Robert Kennedy died, his legislative assistant, Peter Edelman, “angrily criticized” the
attempt of some proponents of the crime bill “to cash in on the tragedy, pointing out that the bill
‘contains measures that [Senator] Kennedy very deeply opposed.’” RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF
CRIME 108 (1969).
355. Dripps, supra note 200, at 45–46.
356. For example, Kauper’s article was written four months before Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932), the famous right-to-counsel case, and four years before Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936), the Court’s first Fourteenth Amendment Due Process “coerced confession” case.
357. Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). Although, as Kauper himself made clear, he was not the first to make
the proposal, he was the first to evaluate with any degree of thoroughness the policy and
constitutional issues raised by such a plan. See Yale Kamisar, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of
the Accused” Forty Years Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15,
15 n.3 (1974).
358. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 708–16; see also WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
SOCIETY 78–81 (1967).
359. This model is discussed at considerable length in Kamisar, supra note 357.
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Kauper proposal, one feature remained the same—”[t]he only sanction,”
in the event the suspect refused to answer any questions when brought
before a judicial officer, would be disclosure of this refusal at the trial.360
In one respect, at least, the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan and the
McNabb-Mallory rule are related. Each is based on the premise that
suspects should be taken out of the hands of the police (the danger
period) as quickly as possible and brought before a presumably more
neutral magistrate or other judicial officer.
Professor Kauper balked at allowing a suspect’s lawyer to be present
at the pretrial hearing before a judicial officer.361 One reason was that he
thought it would take too long to arrange to have a lawyer at the
suspect’s side. (It certainly would have in the 1930s, when there were
few, if any, public defenders.) By the time counsel arrived, maintained

360. Friendly, supra note 195, at 713; SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 80.
Three decades after Judges Friendly and Schaefer revised the Kauper proposal, Akhil Reed Amar
& Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 857 (1995), offered another plan, one which seemed to start out like the Kauper proposal, but
then moved in a different direction. Under the Amar-Lettow proposal (criticized in Yale Kamisar,
On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 929 (1995)), a suspect who refused to answer any questions at a judicially supervised
pretrial hearing could be held in contempt. Moreover, even if the suspect were compelled to answer,
whether at the pretrial hearing or in the police station, significant evidence might still be admissible.
Although the suspect’s compelled words could not be used against him, the evidence derived from
such words—for example, the whereabouts of damaging evidence or the existence and identity of
prosecution witnesses—would still be admissible. See id. at 858–59, 898–99. Why so? “Physical
evidence . . . can be introduced at trial whatever its source—even if that source is a compelled
pretrial utterance” because “[a] witness testifies but physical evidence does not.” Id. at 900.
Some 120 years ago, the Court struck down a federal immunity statute because it merely
prohibited the use of the testimony given—not the use of information derived from the compelled
testimony. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); see also Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 437 (1956). The Court has made plain that the use and derivative use of the
compelled testimony is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. See
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Kamisar, supra at 930–36.
The Court has forbidden comment on the refusal of a defendant to testify at his own trial because
such comment amounts to “a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.”
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). Why would the Court allow a magistrate or other
judicial officer presiding over a pretrial hearing to hold a suspect in contempt for refusing to
answer? Whatever one’s views about the significance of Miranda, we are talking about something
else—the contempt sanction—the power to compel a person to speak within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.
Amar and Lettow contemplate a day when police interrogation no longer occurs in the
stationhouse, only at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer. However, if the courts
follow the lead of Amar and Lettow, I doubt that day will ever arise. If the courts allow the police to
use the often-valuable evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, why would the police ever
cease questioning suspects in the stationhouse?
361. Kauper, supra note 357, at 1247.

05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1034

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/14/2012 12:28 PM

[Vol. 87:965

Kauper, the interrogation before the magistrate would “lose its
effectiveness” for “[i]ts value depends upon interrogation immediately
upon arrest.”362
It is understandable if a right to counsel at a judicially-supervised
interrogation seemed neither “fair” nor “feasible” in 1932.363 But it
seems both fair and feasible today. Therefore, although Judge Schaefer
does not specifically consider this issue, Judge Friendly assumed
Schaefer would require defense counsel to be present at the judiciallysupervised interrogation (as Friendly himself would).364
Professor Kauper proposed that “a complete record should be kept of
the interrogation”365 and that the suspect should be told that the entire
record of the interrogation would go to the trial court.366 I am confident
that if today’s technology were available when Kauper made his
proposal eighty years ago, he would have required that the interrogation
be electronically recorded.
So far as I can tell, there has been sparse support for the KauperSchaefer-Friendly proposal since Judges Friendly and Schaefer revived
it more than forty years ago. One reason is obvious: If anything can
doom a reform proposal, it is the need for a constitutional amendment to
effectuate it. Because the Supreme Court had recently held that comment
on the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand in his own defense
constituted a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause,367 both Friendly
and Schaefer assumed that the plan they supported would require a
constitutional amendment.368
Whether an amendment to the Constitution is necessary to clear the
way for the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan is not perfectly clear. At
least two commentators (Albert Alschuler and former federal judge
Marvin Frankel) maintain that an amendment is not needed.369 On the
other hand, several commentators believe Judges Friendly and Schaefer

362. Id.
363. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6
(1956) (“Due process . . . at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in
the light of then existing values and capabilities.”).
364. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 713.
365. Kauper, supra note 357, at 1248.
366. See id. at 1240.
367. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
368. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 721–22; see also SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 78.
369. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2670–72 (1996); Marvin Frankel, From Private Rights to
Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 531 (1976).
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were right the first time.370 But whether the constitutional problems
raised by the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan are insurmountable short of
an amendment, they seem formidable enough to discourage even reformminded state legislatures.
Putting aside constitutional questions, I think there is another reason
why few state legislatures, if any, would be attracted to the KauperSchaefer-Friendly proposal. There are too many unanswered questions
about (a) the role of the police officer who first meets the suspect at the
police station, (b) the role of the police officer who takes the suspect to
the site of the judicially-supervised interrogation, (c) the role of defense
counsel who attends the judicially-supervised interrogation, and (d) the
role of the magistrate or judicial officer who presides over the judiciallysupervised interrogation.
It is not at all clear how much room the police officer has to maneuver
when he first confronts the suspect or arrestee in the police station.
Suppose the suspect blurts out an incriminating statement? May the
police officer ask a follow-up question? Suppose, without any prodding
on the part of the officer, the suspect informs the officer that he wants to
tell him his “side of the story.” May the police officer listen?
What, if anything, may the police officer say to the suspect when he
drives him to the site of the judicially-supervised interrogation? May the
officer engage in conversation with the suspect, so long as he or she does
not touch upon the case? Or would even a conversation about the
previous night’s baseball game or the news of the day be prohibited on
the ground that the officer was trying to build a rapport with the suspect?
Once the hearing before a judicial officer gets underway, what is the
role of the defense lawyer?371 Will the lawyer be able to object to some
questions (or any question) and warn her client not to answer? When a
police officer tells a suspect that his accomplice has already confessed
and is “putting all the blame” on the suspect, may the defense lawyer
warn the suspect that this is an “old police trick”? Will the defense

370. See Donald A. Dripps, Forward: Against Police Interrogation—and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730 (1988); Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory
Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 309 (1987); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1,
25 (1986).
371. Because Professor Kauper operated on the premise that a defense lawyer would not be
present at the judicially-supervised proceeding, he had no occasion to discuss the defense lawyer’s
role. But he left no doubt that if a defense lawyer were present she would be able to act just as she
does at the criminal trial itself. She would “urge [the client] to be guarded in his replies, encourage
him to fabricate a denial or alibi, and make vexatious objections to questions put by the magistrate.”
Kauper, supra note 357, at 1247.
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lawyer be able to demand proof that her client’s accomplice has
confessed?
Finally, what about the role of the judicial officer who presides over
the pretrial hearing? Even though a police officer or prosecutor will be
doing the bulk of the questioning, may the judicial officer intervene at
some point? Suppose the police interrogator tells the suspect or arrestee:
“I’m your brother, you and I are brothers?”372 Or suppose the
interrogator assures the suspect: “You are not a criminal; you are only
someone who needs help, but I can’t help you unless you trust me?”373
At some point, may the judicial officer interrupt the police officer even
though the defense lawyer has made no objection?
Whether defense counsel is allowed to attend the judiciallysupervised interrogation and act with the same freedom a defense lawyer
has at the criminal trial itself may prove to be a decisive issue. Defense
lawyers, public defenders, and civil libertarians are likely to be quite
unhappy if the answer is in the negative. On the other hand, law
enforcement officers are likely to be equally unhappy if defense lawyers
are going to be allowed to block their efforts to obtain incriminating
statements. Law enforcement officials are likely to emphasize a point
Kauper made a long time ago—in order for police interrogation to be
effective it must take place “immediately upon arrest.”374
If it turns out that under the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan, the
defense lawyer will have as much freedom to defend her client at the
pretrial hearing as she does at the criminal trial itself, then, in some
respects, the situation will be similar to “the more extreme position”
advocated by the ACLU, but rejected by the Miranda Court—requiring
the defense lawyer to be actually present in order to dispel the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation.375 To be sure, the defendant who
declines to speak at the pretrial proceeding will pay a price if the case
goes to trial: the jury will be told that the defendant refused to speak at
the earlier hearing. But how steep a price is this?
Recently, the Supreme Court reminded us that “ours ‘is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials’”—“[n]inety-seven percent
of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.”376 Nor is that all. Even if a defendant chooses

372. See Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1986).
373. See id. at 602, 609, 636.
374. See supra note 361.
375. See supra notes 310–14.
376. Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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to remain silent at the judicially-supervised interrogation, he could still
testify at his trial. Moreover, I assume he could still tell the jury that he
declined to speak earlier only because at that particular point in time his
lawyer told him he lacked a complete grasp of the factual situation.
Shortly after Professor Kauper and some others proposed a judiciallysupervised interrogation as a substitute for traditional police
interrogation, “legislation was urged in several states.”377 What
happened?
According to Justice Schaefer: “Perhaps because constitutional
doctrines did not then, as now, threaten the extinction of police
questioning, the proposals met with public indifference or hostility. The
police were especially hostile . . . .”378
Justice Schaefer’s observations that constitutional doctrines
“threaten[ed] the extinction of police questioning” in the 1960s needs
some clarification. Although Schaefer’s lectures were delivered two
months before the Miranda case was decided, they were published a
year after Miranda was handed down. Nevertheless his book is based on
the lectures as delivered. The lectures discuss neither the impact of
Miranda on police interrogation nor how Miranda changed existing
precedent. At the time Schaefer gave his lectures, the leading case was
not Miranda, but Escobedo v. Illinois.379 And Escobedo did contain
some broad, sweeping language—language that Schaefer and others
believed did threaten police interrogation as we have come to know it.380

377. SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 77.
378. Id.
379. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
380. To quote Justice Schaefer in his 1966 lectures, “the doctrines converging upon the institution
of police interrogation are threatening to push on to their logical conclusion—to the point where no
questioning of suspects will be permitted.” SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 9; see also Arnold N.
Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 91 (1964) (voicing fears that the Court might be in the process of
shaping “a novel right not to confess except knowingly and with the tactical assistance of counsel”).
I should add that Justice Schaefer and I had numerous conversations about police interrogation and
confessions both before and after Miranda. We were both members of the Advisory Committee to
the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure project. In addition, we
were fellow panelists at a number of gatherings and conferences about police interrogation and
confessions both before and after Miranda. He was greatly concerned that the Court might
ultimately abolish the institution of police interrogation.
Even after Miranda was decided (a case which seemed to retreat from the most sweeping language
in Escobedo), Herbert Packer, one of the leading criminal procedure commentators of his time,
observed:
[I]t seems safe to predict that if the Miranda rule does not produce the intended effect of
reducing the incidence of confessions, particularly by suspects who do not have the financial
means to obtain counsel, the Court is likely to take the next step in the direction of the Due
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If police interrogation “as we know it” ever faced extinction, it is safe
to say it no longer does. In fact, police interrogation seems to be faring
quite well. There may have been a time in the 1960s when some police
officials or prosecutors were willing to “settle for” judicially-supervised
interrogation, but that time has come and gone. Law enforcement will no
longer settle for judicially-supervised interrogation. Neither, I submit,
will the public.
A FINAL REFLECTION
Most of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases were strongly
criticized when they were handed down. Mallory, Mapp v. Ohio,381
Escobedo and Miranda quickly come to mind. Gideon v. Wainwright,382
the famous right-to-counsel case, is a conspicuous exception. Why is
that?
Frank Allen once suggested that it was because Gideon was
“supported by a broad ethical consensus.”383 I hesitate to disagree with
Professor Allen because when I started writing about criminal procedure
I found him more helpful than anyone else. But I doubt that the warm
reception Gideon received had much to do with the “broad ethical
consensus” supporting it.
It is true that twenty-two states urged the Supreme Court to overturn
precedent and to assure that all indigent persons being prosecuted for a
felony be furnished counsel “as a matter of due process of law and of
equal protection of the laws.”384 It is also true that when Clarence
Gideon’s court-appointed lawyer, Abe Fortas, learned about the states’
amicus brief, he said he was “proud of this document as an
American.”385 However, when Mr. Fortas read the states’ brief, he must
have soon realized that it spoke only of the need for a defense lawyer in
the courtroom:
Any trial, but particularly a criminal trial, is a highly complex,

Process Model, which would be flatly to prohibit the use in evidence of statements given by
suspects to the police.
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 194 (1968).
381. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
382. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
383. Allen, supra note 43, at 540.
384. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 150 (1964). The twenty-two states were led by
Walter F. Mondale, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Attorney
General of Massachusetts.
385. Id. at 173.
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technical proceeding requiring representation by a trained legal
adviser . . . . The layman cannot, for instance, be expected to
know procedure, whether to testify, how to cross-examine. The
trial judge . . . can never be sure when, during the trial, the need
for counsel will arise.386
There are many problems in criminal procedure that are beyond the
control of the courts. Anthony Amsterdam once observed: “[I]f the
Court strikes down a police practice, announces a ‘right’ of a criminal
suspect in his dealings with the police, God only knows what the result
will be.”387
But it is much easier for a judge to make sure that counsel is
appointed than to see to it that Mapp or Miranda is honored. Moreover,
a judge who sees to it that counsel is appointed does not have to face
criticism that he “second-guessed” a police officer who had to make a
quick decision.
In a case like Gideon, another factor is at work—visibility. “One of
the most powerful features of the Due Process Model,” Herbert Packer
once observed, “is that it thrives on visibility. People are willing to be
complacent about what goes on in the criminal process as long as they
are not too often or too explicitly reminded of the gory details.”388
Neither judges, nor other lawyers, nor spectators, like to see an
untrained, uneducated criminal defendant floundering in the courtroom,
trying to cross-examine a prosecution witness or trying to keep out
certain evidence. But who sees the suspect in the so-called “interview
room” in the early morning hours? Who sees the suspect being searched
on a dark street or in an alley?
Gideon did not start a new trend. Several years after Gideon was
argued, Miranda came before the Supreme Court. This case, too,
involved the right to counsel, but at an earlier stage of the criminal
process—at the police station. This time, however, not a single state
sided with Mr. Miranda. Instead, twenty-seven states signed an amicus
brief against him.
Justice Black once suggested that a person is in greater need of a
lawyer when arrested than at any other time.389 If so, were the people

386. Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae at 4, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155)
(emphasis added) (summary of argument).
387. Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 791. Professor Amsterdam went on to say: “Out there in the
formless void, some adjustment will undoubtedly be made to accommodate the new ‘right,’ but
what the product of this whole exercise will be remains unfathomable.” Id.
388. PACKER, supra note 380, at 242.
389. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 107, at 567 (oral arguments in Miranda).
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who supported Mr. Gideon when his case was before the Court, and who
applauded the Court’s opinion when it was handed down, really in favor
of the right to counsel? Or were they only in favor of that right when it
didn’t hurt too much?

